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INTRODUCTION
The conservation of imperiled wildlife species, a fundamental objec-
tive of the Endangered Species Act' ("ESA"), conflicts, at times, with the
United States' responsibilities to promote American Indian rights to gov-
ern and develop reservation lands and resources. Critical habitat designa-
tion in Indian Country2 poses a near irreconcilable conflict. Designation
effectively "zones" areas within Indian Country for the benefit of a single
listed species in accordance with federal - not tribal - prerogatives. As
such, designation is a direct affront to tribal sovereignty. Designation can
severely restrict a tribe's ability not only to govern, but also to conserve
and utilize its land, diminishing the reservation's character as the single
most important tribal resource. In turn, designation flies in the face of the
United States' solemn promises to preserve tribal homelands for the undis-
turbed use of Indian Nations and to protect tribal sovereignty from exter-
nal incursions.
Because Indian Country is typically less developed than surrounding
private and state lands, it affords an island of suitable habitat in a sea of
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, et seq [hereinafter
ESA]. Designation of critical habitat is authorized by Section 4 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948). "Indian country" means:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights- of-way [sic] running through the reservation, (b) all dependent
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or with-
out the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id. "Indian land" describes a subset of the lands within Indian Country and generally encom-
passes only those lands held in trust for an individual Indian or tribe. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 3103
(defining Indian lands as "land title to which is held by (A) the United States in trust for an
Indian, an individual of Indian or Alaska Native ancestry who is not a member of a federally-
recognized Indian tribe, or an Indian tribe, or (B) an Indian, an individual of Indian or Alaska
Native ancestry who is not a member of a federally recognized tribe, or an Indian tribe subject to
a restriction by the United States against alienation"). The term Indian land is generally used in
this article not as a jurisdictional limitation, but to describe the real property resource.
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lands altered by development activities: timber harvesting; road-building;
mineral extraction; solid and hazardous waste disposal; and agriculture.
Not surprisingly, habitat for listed species in Indian Country - even unoc-
cupied, marginally suitable habitat - is often viewed by federal agencies as
desirable for inclusion in critical habitat designations. Yet, while the appli-
cation of the ESA's habitat provisions to private property has generated a
sustained furor among private property owners, fueling the fire for propos-
als to amend the statute, very little attention has been given to the ESA's
effects on lands within Indian Country. Recently, however, decisions to
designate critical habitat on tribal lands, particularly in the southwestern
United States, have brought the ESA-trust responsibility conflict to a head.
One such decision, the designation of critical habitat for the Mexican
Spotted Owl,3 illustrates the curious dichotomy which can result when fed-
eral agencies implement a generally applicable statute, such as the ESA, in
the absence of concrete guidance for effectuating the United States' trust
obligation to tribes. The owl designation illustrates both the best and worst
possible outcomes for tribal sovereignty and self-determination. On one
hand, the decision excluded the lands of the White Mountain and Jicarilla
Apache Tribes, which had adopted tribal management plans protective of
owl habitat.4 This result represents the promise of mutual decision-making
processes for imperiled species, the surrounding ecosystem and tribal inter-
ests. At the same time, however, the lands of the Southern Ute Indian
Tribe, which are only minimally beneficial to the species, were included in
the designation as a result of failed communications and, ultimately, a
heavy-handed unilateral decision.'
To address some of the tribes' concerns regarding ESA implementa-
tion, the Departments of Interior and Commerce recently issued a Secreta-
rial Order on American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust
Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act.6 The Order, which re-
sulted from bilateral negotiations between tribal representatives and execu-
tive agencies, includes information exchange and consultation provisions as
well as substantive requirements for listing and designation decisions af-
fecting tribal resources. More specifically, the Appendix to the Order pro-
vides that critical habitat designation should only occur in Indian Country
if essential to conserve the species. It directs the agencies to consider
3. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,914
(1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
4. Id. at 29,929-31.
5. Id. at 29,919; Southern Ute Tribe v. Babbitt, No. 96-M-1369 (D. Colo.) [hereinafter
Southern Ute Complaint] (complaint filed June 10, 1996) (copy on file with author). The Tribe
challenged the designation decision, alleging breach of trust and violations of various federal
statutes, including the ESA, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1994), and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1966 ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1994). For discussion of the designation decision and litigation, see infra at Section IV.A.3.
6. Interior/Commerce Secretarial Order 3206 - American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tri-
bal Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act (June 5, 1997) [hereinafter Secretarial
Order] (copy on file with author).
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whether conservation requirements could be met through designation of
non-Indian lands. Thus, the Order provides a mechanism for prioritizing
the interests of Indian tribes both in conserving species and in utilizing
their lands for economic development, consistent with the trust responsibil-
ity and tribal sovereignty. It is a reasoned approach to the difficult balanc-
ing act necessitated by conflicting demands to conserve species and to
promote the use and enjoyment of tribal trust resources.
The Secretarial Order provides much-needed guidance to executive
agencies. Standing alone, however, the Order, as non-binding, unenforce-
able executive policy, does not go far enough. Indeed, the only post-Order
decision affecting Indian Country to date, designating critical habitat for
the Southwest Willow Flycatcher,7 evidences nothing more than "business
as usual." The Flycatcher decision gives lip service to the Order, but com-
pletely fails to address the Order's criteria for designating tribal lands. It
lacks any findings regarding the "essential" nature of habitat on tribal lands
vis-a-vis surrounding areas as directed by the Order and its Appendix, and
it appears that very little consultation occurred with the tribes prior to in-
cluding their lands in the designation.
As the Flycatcher decision makes clear, the Secretarial Order's re-
quirements will be effectuated only if the Order is enforceable against the
implementing agencies. Common law interpretations of the trust responsi-
bility should embrace the Order's provisions, particularly those relevant to
the designation and management of critical habitat. As an expression of
the trust responsibility, the Order gains the binding status which it now
lacks.
This article begins by examining the federal trust responsibility as it
relates to the conservation and utilization of reservation lands and natural
resources by Indian Nations.8 Section II describes the requirements of the
ESA, particularly those which provide for the protection of wildlife habitat.
The Secretarial Order is analyzed in Section III. Section IV considers the
importance of the reservation to tribal sovereignty and survival and con-
cludes that the ESA's critical habitat provisions should apply to Indian
lands only as a matter of last resort, and then only in accordance with the
provisions of the Secretarial Order.
7. Final Determination of Critical Habitat for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed.
Reg. 39,129, 39,136 (1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
8. A related issue arises when tribal economic pursuits in Indian Country result in "inciden-
tal takings" of listed species in the course of otherwise lawful land development activities. 16
U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), (o)(2); 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding regulatory definition of "tak-
ing" to apply both to activities which directly harm a listed species, such as hunting, and to activi-
ties which degrade essential habitat, in turn, causing actual harm to the species). For extended
treatment and analysis, see Jennifer M. Regis-Civetta, The Effect of the Endangered Species Act
on Tribal Economic Development in Indian Country, 50 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 303(1996). As discussed below, I do not agree with Regis-Civetta's conclusion that the ESA should
be strictly applied to abrogate treaty rights, even as to incidental takings. Id. at 344-45. See
discussion, infra Section II.C.2.
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I. THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY INCLUDES PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE DUTIES TOWARD INDIAN
LANDS AND RESOURCES
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
It is well-established that, in dealing with Indian Nations, the United
States "has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibil-
ity and trust."9 Yet, there is no constitutional or legislative provision that
expresses the general trust responsibility in explicit terms. Instead, the
duty arises from federal common law extending back to the landmark
Supreme Court cases of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 10 and Worcester v.
Georgia,"' both penned by Chief Justice Marshall. Notably, Worcester
founded the duty on the status of tribes as "distinct political communi-
ties,"12 sovereign nations protected by the might of the "more powerful"
national government:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independ-
ent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the
single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded
them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the
first discoverer .... [Thus the Indian nation] does not surrender its
independence - its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection. 3
This language makes it clear that tribal autonomy, which is derived not
from federal policy but from the tribes' own original, inherent sovereignty,
is a core value of the trust relationship. 4 With respect to matters of inter-
nal self-government, tribal authority is exclusive, absent limitation by
9. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
10. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
12. Id. at 557. In Cherokee Nation, the Court described Indian tribes as "domestic depen-
dent nations." 30 U.S. at 17. In Worcester, the Court attempted to further define the parameters
of the federal-tribal relationship, stating that tribes have the status of sovereign nations protected
by the might of the federal government. 31 U.S. at 555.
13. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-60. The general trust relationship reflects "the distinctive obli-
gation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and some-
times exploited people." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (citing Seminole
Nation, 316 U.S. at 296). Although the trust relationship has been criticized as a paternalistic
outgrowth of the legal theory of conquest, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal
Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurispru-
dence, 1986 Wis. L. RIzv. 219, it still serves an important purpose today in that it requires a
prioritization of Indian interests, particularly those that relate to treaty resources, over other
federal interests, and places parameters on the otherwise sweeping discretion of federal agencies.
14. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232 (1982). Although the
Supreme Court has found that "discovery" by Europeans, see Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823), and incorporation into the United States placed limitations on the exter-
nal sovereign powers of the tribes, such as the power to establish political relationships with other
foreign nations, Worcester plainly acknowledges that Indian Nations did not lose their basic sov-
ereign authority by virtue of their relationship with the federal government. Worcester, 31 U.S. at
561; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. See Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development on
Indian Reservations: Overview of Tribal, State, and Federal Jurisdiction, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
71, 74 (1992).
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treaty or statute.15 That authority includes the power to determine tribal
membership and the form of tribal government, to legislate, administer jus-
tice, control activities within tribal jurisdiction, and exclude unwanted per-
sons and intrusions from the reservation.16
The trust responsibility to Indian Nations is further defined by treaties,
statutes, regulations and executive orders.17 Treaties, in particular, "reflect
a set of sovereign promises and expectations that continue to be at the
heart of defining the modern contours of this relationship."' 8 Treaties rep-
resent a bargained-for exchange in which tribes agreed to make peace and
cede a portion of their aboriginal lands to the United States in return for "a
cessation of hostilities, the provision of some services, and most impor-
tantly, the establishment and recognition of a reservation homeland free
from the incursion of both the state and non-Indian settlers."19 In other
words, tribes bargained for a piece of their homelands, often drastically
reduced in size, and the right to continue to govern their own affairs.2 °
Thus, the trust responsibility arises not only from the nature of the
relationship between tribes and the United States, but also from the mas-
sive transfer of lands from Indian Nations to the federal government and
the retention and protection of a critical - though diminished - land
base, as reflected in treaties.21 Just as sovereignty is at the very core of the
trust responsibility, the tribal land base, retained by the tribes through trea-
ties, is a critical component of sovereignty for most tribes.22
15. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 47-48; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581, 595.
16. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989) (noting that exclusivity has been diminished by the allotment era); Edwardsen v.
Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (D.D.C. 1973) (finding a governmental duty to prevent trespass
on Indian lands to protect aboriginal rights to use and occupancy).
17. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 224; North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611-12 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). See also COHEN, supra note 14, at 220-28 (discussing the trust relationship and its
limits on congressional power).
18. Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place, 34 S.D. L. REV. 246, 252-53 (1989) [here-
inafter Place].
19. Place, supra note 18, at 253 (emphasis added). See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 120-22 (1986) (stating that treaties represent "real promises"
which advance the "fulfillment of the ultimate promise" - the reservation as a homeland and
"island[ ] of indianness within the larger society"). See also id. at 100-01 (describing bargaining
positions).
20. See Place, supra note 18, at 254-55. Not all tribes were able to retain their aboriginal
homelands, however. For example, the five civilized tribes of the southeastern United States (the
Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw and Seminole) were removed to the Oklahoma Territory
in a forced migration which has since become known as the Trail of Tears. See id. at 252, 254 n.26
(citing G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL (1932)). See also DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 152-54 (3d ed. 1993) (citing RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE
AND THE SPIRITS - CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN To COURT 65-67 (1975); D'ARCY McNICKLE,
THEY CAME HERE FIRST 199-200 (rev. ed. 1975)).
21. See Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Na-
tive Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promises
and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 742 (1995) [hereinafter Clinton Critique]. Today, there are
approximately 53 million acres held in trust for tribes, COHEN, supra note 14, at 471, and 57
million total acres of Indian fee and trust lands within reservation boundaries, which represents
three percent of the original land base, Clinton Critique, supra, at 740. Of the 2 million Indians in
the United States, approximately half live on or near the 387 reservations. Id. at 735 n.3.
22. See Clinton Critique, supra note 22, at 742-43 (concluding that the trust doctrine "repre-
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Although the Supreme Court has held that Congress may wield its
plenary power over Indian affairs to abrogate treaty rights and even to di-
minish or extinguish the reservation land base altogether,23 it has cautioned
the legislature not to cast solemn treaties aside lightly. 24 Moreover, execu-
tive agencies, unlike Congress, may not unilaterally avoid the trust obliga-
tions embodied in treaty provisions, or in legislative or executive policy. 5
Agencies must fulfill the trust responsibility in conducting any federal ac-
tion which relates to tribal trust resources.2 6 The duty requires federal
agencies to deal with tribes according to the "most exacting fiduciary stan-
dards, ''2 7 enforceable through lawsuits for monetary damages28 or for equi-
sents that measure of legal responsibility on the part of the majority society to protect what the
native population retained").
23. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). The Court noted that Congress has
power to:
abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will
be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the govern-
ment in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the inter-
est of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.
Id.
24. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (stating "Great Nations, like great men, should keep their word."). Congress itself,
through the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, has proclaimed the importance of preserving
the tribal land base by preventing alienation of Indian lands. See Joint Tribal Council of Passama-
quoddy Tribes v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975) (noting "[t]hat the Nonintercourse Act
imposes upon the federal government a fiduciary's role with respect to protection of the lands of
a tribe covered by the Act seems to us beyond question").
25. Compare Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 556 (concluding that Congress possesses the power to
abrogate Indian treaties) with United States v. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 542 F.2d 1002,
1004-06 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the Corps of Engineers has no authority to take by eminent
domain tribal lands reserved by treaty). For a discussion of the distinction between executive and
congressional powers with respect to Indian trust resources, and the role of judicial review of
equitable claims for breach of trust arising from executive actions, see Reid P. Chambers, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1218-48 (1975)
(determining that although Congress is "the ultimate umpire of the purposes of the trust relation-
ship," the trust obligation requires "strict executive compliance").
26. See Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that the
agency has a trust obligation to protect wildlife upon which treaty rights depend); Nance v. EPA,
645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir.) (1980) (EPA must act with the care of a trustee in approving North-
ern Cheyenne Tribe's redesignation of air quality standards, which allegedly would inhibit coal
mining on nearby Crow reservation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981); Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) [hereinafter Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Morton] (concluding that trust responsibility requires the Secretary to preserve water for
the tribe to protect fishery resources), modified on other grounds, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
27. Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297.
28. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994) (providing jurisdiction in the U.S. Claims
Court for damages claims against the United States); Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (al-
lowing Claims Court to hear monetary claims by Indian tribes). See also Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 206.
In the context of monetary claims against the government, a breach of trust would be found
under Mitchell only where the trust duty is (1) tied to a congressional enactment for federal
management of trust resources, although the word "trust" or "fiduciary" need not appear on the
face of the statute, id. at 224-25, or (2) the government has in fact assumed extensive control over
tribal resources, id. at 222. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1519-20 (1994) [hereinafter
Indian Land]. This is so because the Tucker Act creates jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, a
court of limited jurisdiction, only for claims which satisfy its explicit limitations: those which are
"founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department" or a contract with the United States. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). In con-
1998]
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table relief.29
Typically, breach of trust by executive agencies can occur in either of
two ways: when an agency fails to carry out specific statutory mandates
regarding management of tribal resources in accordance with fiduciary
standards, or when an agency neglects tribal trust resources in executing
general statutory authorities. Analysis of claims arising under the first cat-
egory is relatively straightforward. Where tribes claim a breach of trust for
mismanagement of resources, such as timber or money, the statute itself
defines the contours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities.30
In the second instance, where an agency's organic statutory mandates
impact tribal rights, which is often the case when environmental statutes
such as the ESA are enforced, the parameters of the trust duty are more
difficult to pinpoint. General statutory mandates which incidently affect
the use and enjoyment of tribal property or treaty rights can severely im-
pair or even destroy a tribe's way of life.31 In other words, agency action
may be in strict compliance with the letter of the statute, but fail to satisfy
the trust obligation to affected tribes. Accordingly, when federal agencies
act to fulfill statutory mandates in the name of the public interest, they
must also remain vigilant toward tribal interests by carefully analyzing im-
pacts on trust resources. 32 Agencies cannot simply make a "judgment call"
trast, federal district courts, though also of limited jurisdiction, have more extensive authority to
hear equitable claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994); 5 U.S.C. § 704.
29. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923) (canceling land patent to railroad
for land occupied by individual Indians); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919)
(allowing suit to enjoin governmental treatment of Pueblo lands as public lands of the United
States); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 257-58 (granting declaratory and
injunctive relief against Secretary of Interior's regulations which provided for diversions of water
from lake on tribal lands). See also Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Rela-
tionship After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 635, 640-41 (1982) (analyzing jurisdictional issues in
context of breach of trust claims). Claims for equitable relief can be asserted against executive
agencies under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides federal question jurisdiction for claims based on
federal common law, using the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, as a vehicle for judicial review. The
APA provides that final agency action can be set aside as, inter alia, (1) "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law"; (2) "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, au-
thority or limitations"; or (3) "contrary to constitutional right[s]." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(C).
30. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 224. The Court found that the Indian timber management stat-
utes "clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and
land for the benefit of Indians" thereby "establish[ing] a fiduciary relationship and defin[ing] the
contours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities." Id. The Court continued, stating that
such a relationship and concomitant duty would arise wherever the government "takes on or has
control or supervision over tribal monies or properties." Id. at 225. For the text of the Indian
timber management statutes, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 406-07, 466 (1994).
31. See Clinton Critique, supra note 22, at 741-42, 744 nn. 31-32, n.38 (describing effects of
diminished salmon runs in the Columbia River Basin on Umatilla Tribes' economic base, cultural
and religious ceremonies and entire way of life; the Tribes invoke the trust responsibility in seek-
ing enhanced water quality protection and water flows and protection of tribal treaty fishing
rights).
32. See Northwest Seafarms v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F. Supp. 1515
(W.D. Wash. 1996) (holding that, in carrying out requirements of Clean Water Act, Corps must
ensure that treaty rights are given full effect); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United
States Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420-21 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe v. Navy] (stating that the trust responsibility to protect tribal resources is not necessarily
satisfied simply because the ESA's requirements have been met); Northern Arapahoe Tribe, 808
F.2d at 750 (finding that, upon request of Shoshone Tribe, government must protect treaty re-
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in favor of public accommodation if tribal interests would be adversely af-
fected. 33 The trust obligation requires agencies to protect tribal property
interests to the greatest extent possible, although they are not required to
ignore other competing interests.34
B. DEFINING THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUTIES TOWARD
TRUST RESOURCES
The trust responsibility, in broad-brush terms, encompasses both sub-
stantive and procedural requirements.35 The substantive duty mandates
the protection, as well as tribal use and enjoyment, of Indian lands and
natural resources. The procedural duty requires meaningful tribal partici-
pation in decisions that affect tribal resources.
1. Consultation
Procedurally, agencies must carefully consider the impact of proposed
federal actions on treaty resources. 36 Agency activities which may affect
tribal rights or resources must be implemented in a manner respectful of
tribal sovereignty.37 Executive policy requires agencies to give tribes a
meaningful role in assessing impacts to trust resources by consulting with
them on a government-to-government basis.38
Although the parameters of the duty to consult have not been well-
defined by the judiciary, where federal activities affect trust resources,
tribes should be entitled to greater involvement than the due process rights
sources from "misappropriation by third parties," including overuse of game by Arapahoe, who
occupy the Wind River Indian Reservation jointly with the Shoshone); Nance, 645 F.2d at 710
(examining implications of the trust duty in implementing the Clean Air Act).
33. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 256 (invalidating Department
of Interior regulation as an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the federal common
law of trust where agency diverted water from a tribe to satisfy non-Indian irrigation interests).
34. Id. In carrying out their general statutory missions, however, agencies have not necessar-
ily been held to "the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his
single beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's
consent." Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855, 859 (10th Cir. 1986)
(Seth, J., dissenting) (citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983)). In other words,
courts allow some balancing where strict adherence to the general trust responsibility would con-
flict with statutorily mandated duties toward the public. See New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 850 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that the "commission was
bound to consider impacts on non-Indian Americans" in conducting its public interest review
regarding decision to grant permit to railroad to construct its line over Navajo lines; interest in
promoting tribal self-sufficiency need not be elevated to "the status of a universal trump"); North
Slope Borough, 642 F.2d at 612-13 (finding that the Secretary has discretion under ESA to bal-
ance subsistence needs of Inupiat with other public interests).
35. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
36. See Klamath Tribes v. United States, No. 96-381-HA, 1996 WL 924509, at *8 (D. Or. Oct.
2, 1996) (holding that Forest Service must consult with Tribe and consider effects of timber har-
vest on mule deer and other tribal resources).
37. See Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 487-90 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that issuance
of logging permits to members was internal matter fully within tribal authority).
38. Presidential Memorandum, Government-to-Government Relations with Native Ameri-
can Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1994) [hereinafter President's Memorandum on
Government-to-Government Relations].
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afforded non-Indians.39 Courts have noted that, "[i]n practical terms, a
procedural duty has arisen from the trust relationship such that the federal
government must consult with an Indian Tribe in the decision-making pro-
cess to avoid adverse effects on treaty resources. ' 4' Thus, the consultation
duty can provide a significant procedural safeguard by requiring tribal
participation.
The value of the processes afforded by consultation, however, is some-
times undermined by executive and judicial action. Unless the agency's
discretion is otherwise curtailed by specific legal standards, agencies may
be given wide discretion to define the method and timing of consultation.41
Moreover, courts have held that the duty to consult does not give the tribes
a veto authority: "[c]onsultation is not the same as obeying those who are
consulted. ' 42 Without some substantive standard to back up the proce-
dural requirements, a right to consult may, in fact, be less than meaningful.
2. Tribal Sovereignty and Resources
Substantively, the trust obligation extends to tribal sovereignty and tri-
39. See Northwest Seafarms, 931 F. Supp. at 1520 (noting that although agency's regulations
do not specifically require consideration of treaty rights as part of "public interest" review man-
dated by statute, trust and treaty obligations provide it with the authority to do so; Corps must
ensure that treaty rights are given full effect); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L.
Rep. 3065, 3070 (D. Mont. 1985) (Interior's procedural duty to consult with tribes regarding im-
pacts on trust and treaty rights is violated if tribes are treated like mere citizens), remanded for
modification of injunction, 851 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1988).
40. Klamath Tribes, 1996 WL 924509, at *8 (citing Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Indians v.
Washington, 668 F. Supp. 1233, 1240 (W.D.Wis. 1987); President's Memorandum on Govern-
ment-to-Government Relations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,951). The court also noted that the Forest
Plan governing the timber sales at issue in the case acknowledged the consultation duty, and held
that "[a] determination of what constitutes compliance with treaty obligations should not be
made unilaterally; rather, the Tribe's view of the hunting, fishing, gathering, and trapping activi-
ties protected by the treaty must be solicited, discussed, and considered." Klamath Tribes, 1996
WL 924509, at *8. A preliminary injunction issued which prohibited the Forest Service from
proceeding with logging under the Salvage Timber Rider, P.L. 104-19, without ensuring protec-
tion of treaty resources in consultation with the Klamath Tribes on a government-to-government
basis. Id. at *9. See also Lower Brule Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.S.D. 1995) (requir-
ing consultation prior to reductions in force of BIA employees on reservation); Oglala Sioux
Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 720-21 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that BIA's failure to
consult with tribe before making decision to reassign Indian Superintendent violated its trust
responsibility to the tribe as well as its own internal guidelines for consultation; two post-decision
meetings did not constitute "meaningful consultation").
41. See Nance, 645 F.2d at 711. There, the Ninth Circuit was willing to defer to the adequacy
of the agency's consultation process in a Clean Air Act dispute. The court reviewed the proce-
dures used by EPA in determining whether the agency's approval of the Northern Cheyenne
Tribe's redesignation of air quality standards on its reservation would violate trust responsibilities
to the neighboring Crow Tribe, who alleged that the redesignation would adversely affect the coal
mining activities on their reservation. The court held that, in light of the fiduciary duties owed to
both the Crow Tribe and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, the Crow had been given a sufficient
opportunity to participate in the decision making process through the Clean Air Act's procedural
requirements, which provided for a public hearing and a formal protest process. Id. The court
noted that Crow Tribe had not availed itself of the opportunity for official protest. Id.
42. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1987). See Lower Brule
Tribe, 911 F. Supp. at 401. The court stated that although "meaningful consultation means tribal
consultation in advance with the decision maker or with intermediaries with clear authority to
present tribal views to the BIA decision maker . . . the tribe recognizes that the BIA need not
obey the Council's decision." Id.
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bal resources, in particular, reservation lands.4 3 Pursuant to the majority of
treaties with Indian Nations, tribes ceded some of their aboriginal lands to
the United States in exchange for the "absolute and undisturbed use" of
retained lands.4 4 These retained lands are critical to tribal sovereignty and,
indeed, the very survival of tribes as distinct cultural and political commu-
nities.4 5 Agency decisions which affect the reservation resource implicate
several related aspects of the trust responsibility: tribal survival, sover-
eignty and self-determination,4 6 as well as tribal property rights and eco-
nomic interests.
First, development of reservation resources, more than simply a stick
in a tribe's bundle of property rights,47 is critical to the survival of Indian
Nations as nations and to the fulfillment of tribal self-determination. 8
Utilization of trust lands to promote political and economic self-determina-
tion is an important attribute of the trust responsibility toward survival of
43. See Passamaquoddy Tribe, 528 F.2d at 379 (invalidating transfer of tribal lands to the
state of Maine, and stating that it is "beyond question" that the federal government has a fiduci-
ary role to protect tribal lands covered by the Nonintercourse Act, which extends to the lands of
"any Indian nation or tribe of Indians").
44. See, e.g., Treaty with the Ute, March 2, 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 619; Treaty with the Sioux -
Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs,
and Santee - and Arapaho, 1868, April 29, 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter Treaty of Fort
Laramie] (setting apart reservation for "undisturbed use and occupation" of Great Sioux Nation,
and providing that "no persons except those herein designated and authorized so to do . . . shall
ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory described in this article").
See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 375 (1980) (holding that Sioux Nation was enti-
tled to compensation for abrogation of Treaty of Fort Laramie); Place, supra note 18, at 254
(discussing importance of land base encompassed in Treaty of Fort Laramie). See also Brendale,
492 U.S. at 414-15 (stating that provisions for exclusive use of reservation lands are common in
many treaties); WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 16-18 (noting that "isolation of Indian societies on
the reservation was a common policy goal"; treaties reflected this goal by providing "absolute and
undisturbed use and occupation" of the reservation and absolutely forbidding entry by unauthor-
ized persons). Cf Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994) (preserving the native land base by
preventing alienation of Indian lands).
45. See Akins,130 F.3d at 490 (finding that a "significant geographical component" is inher-
ent in tribal sovereignty) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 448 U.S. 136,
151 (1980)). See also Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 740, (stating that "[w]ithout an ecologi-
cally viable land base and an adequate supply of corollary resources to support a tribal commu-
nity and economy, the promise of true autonomy is beyond the grasp of the native nations.").
With respect to tribal survival, see infra, at Section IV.A.1 (equating reservations to "critical
habitat" for Indian Nations).
46. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Law in an Era of Self-Determination: The
Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REv. 225, 229 (1996)
(stating that self-determination effectuates tribal identity and authority through "principles of
group rights, autonomy, and national integrity").
47. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (determining that Congress' efforts to ame-
liorate effects of fractionalization of Indian lands by preventing the descent or devise of small
fractionated interests in property to heirs, which would instead escheat to the tribe, destroys an
important strand in the bundle of property rights) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164 (1979)).
48. See WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 108 (tribes have both proprietary and governmental
interests in economic development of the reservation; "measured separatism cannot exist without
a viable economic base"); Tsosie, supra note 46, at 291 (Indian lands are not merely "a commod-
ity or a factor of production"; rather, the land exists "in a relationship with humans."). See also
Winona LaDuke, Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Environmental Futures, 5 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 130, 146 (1994) (stating that "[t]o the extent that indigenous peoples have
articulated their relationship to the land, they see themselves as belonging to it rather than it to
them").
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tribes as unique cultural and governmental entities. The United States has
long recognized - though not always fully effectuated - tribal interests in
self-sufficiency, both in terms of a "right '49 and as an aspect of self-deter-
mination and sovereignty.50 To alleviate the barriers to political, economic
and cultural autonomy posed by colonization, a panoply of federal statutes
declares the congressional goal of tribal self-determination.5' Administra-
tive regulations and executive orders and memoranda have also embraced
self-determination as a compelling governmental objective.52
Secondly, tribal property interests are encompassed within the trust
obligation. Of course, in western culture, real property is a concept of al-
most mythical proportion. Yet compelling as the Blackstonian ideal of
"total dominion" over property is to Anglo-American societies, 53 land
takes on even greater significance to many Indian tribes: it is the "essential
base of tribal culture, development, and society. '5 4 Incontrovertibly, land
49. Regis-Civetta, supra note 6, at 308 n.35 (citing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25
U.S.C. § 2701(4)-(5) (1994)). See also ROBERT CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 160 (3d
ed. 1991) (noting that the federal self-determination policy has encouraged "economic develop-
ment of Indian lands, particularly the facilitation of leasing of Indian resources").
50. See Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Prescott Convention Center, Inc., 117 F.3d 1107,
1115 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The promotion of tribal economic development has long been recognized
as an important federal interest.") (citing Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell, 91 F.3d at
1237 (9th Cir. 1996) (Pregerson, J., dissenting )). See also California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 n.20 (1987) (stating that the government has an overriding interest in
helping tribes attain economic self-sufficiency); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195,
201 (1985) (recognizing that the tribes' power to obtain revenues is "an essential attribute" of
self-government); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 (1983) (stating tri-
bal regulation of wildlife resources on the reservation is essential aspect of Congress' "overarch-
ing objective" of Indian self-governance and economic development).
51. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, amended by
25 U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (1994) (declaring congressional intent to maintain "Federal Govern-
ment's unique and continuing relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people through
the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly
transition from Federal domination of programs for and services to Indians" so that Indians may
effectively and meaningfully participate in the administration of such programs and services);
Indian Financing Act of 1974, amended by 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1994) (declaring congressional policy
"to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and human, to a point where the
Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the utilization and management of their own re-
sources and where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts compara-
ble to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities").
52. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 253-56. The federal government has promoted a
policy of American Indian self-determination since 1970. Id. (citing President Nixon's Message
Transmitting Recommendation for Indian Policy, July 8, 1970, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 91-363
(1970)). The policy has been embraced and restated by subsequent administration. See 25 C.F.R.
§ 151.2 (1995) (BIA has a responsibility to "improve the economic well being of Indian people
through proper and efficient resource use"); President's Statement on Indian Policy, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 99 (1983); President's Memorandum on Government-to-Government Rela-
tions, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,951. For a comprehensive discussion of the various administrative poli-
cies issued by executive agencies during the Clinton administration, many of which declare as
their purpose the promotion of self-determination, see Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 753-60.
53. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 2-11 (1766), in ROB-
ERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 37-38 (2d ed. 1995) ("There is noth-
ing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right
of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.").
54. Wildman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing COHEN, supra note
14, at 509). See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Pinatas, and
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is also the most important economic resource of many tribes.55 As such,
the United States should act with the jealousy of a fiduciary to protect this
essential base of tribal economy and self-determination. 56
A property owner's right to economic returns from the land has long
been protected as a fundamental component of the "bundle of sticks" of
property ownership." Beyond this, the economic use of natural resources
found on Indian lands has been characterized, by both the legislature and
the judiciary, as a matter of utmost importance. 58 For example, a tribe's
sovereign authority to control economic development has been upheld by
the Supreme Court in cases involving the tribe's power to tax activities
within its jurisdiction, such as mining, 59 and to engage in on-reservation
gaming enterprises.6 °
Moreover, a tribe's ability to use reservation lands for economic devel-
opment implicates its rights in the reservation itself as a trust resource. The
trust obligation finds its very source, at least in part, from the massive ces-
sions of land from the tribes, for which tribes were assured of reserving a
homeland free from incursion.61 Executive agencies should be obligated to
take action consistent with the fact that tribal development of these re-
tained lands is critical to economic development and political and cultural
self-determination.62
An agency's failure to exercise fiduciary care when taking action that
impacts the economic capacity of Indian lands, then, constitutes "a serious
breach" of the trust responsibility. 63 Conversely, agency action which bol-
sters a tribe's sovereignty and economic well-being, particularly that which
Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W. VA.
L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1994) [hereinafter Telescopes] (stating "[w]ithout the land, . . . there is no
tribe").
55. Wildman, 827 F.2d at 1309.
56. Id. The lands held in trust for tribes are "a unique form of property right in the Ameri-
can legal system, shaped by the federal trust over tribal land and statutory restraints against
alienation." Id.
57. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (regulations which
deny "all economically beneficial or productive use of land" must be compensated as "takings"
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.6
(1978)).
58. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 216-18; Akins, 130 F.3d at 487-90; United States v. Sho-
shone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1938) (treaty right to "undisturbed use and occupa-
tion" of land is as sacred as fee simple title, and includes rights to use timber and mineral
resources); Prieto v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 1187, 1195 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that Interior
abused its discretion in revoking trust status for Indian land; the United States has a "solemn duty
'to improve the economic well-being of Indian people through proper and efficient resource
use."') (citing Coomes v. Adkinson, 414 F. Supp. 975, 986 (D.S.D. 1976)). See also National
Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3104(b)(4) (1994) (encouraging
tribal involvement in timber management on Indian lands). See generally Indian Self-Determina-
tion and Education Assistance Act of 1975, amended by 25 U.S.C. § 450a (1994) (encouraging
tribal administration of federal service programs).
59. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
60. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 216-18.
61. For a discussion of the trust obligation, see supra notes 19-22, 44 and accompanying text.
62. See Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 216-18; Prieto, 655 F. Supp. at 1195; Shoshone, 403 U.S. at
115-17. See also Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450f.
63. See Coomes, 414 F. Supp. at 992.
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allows sustained utilization of reservation resources, is generally consistent
with the United States' trust obligations toward Indian Nations.6 4 Agen-
cies must be careful to avoid adverse impacts to tribal resources when im-
plementing statutes of general application, such as the ESA, and should
strive to remove impediments to tribal sovereignty and economic develop-
ment to the greatest extent possible.
II. THE ESA, ITS HABITAT PROTECTION PROVISIONS, AND
ITS APPLICATION TO INDIAN LANDS
Congress enacted the ESA to conserve imperiled wildlife species and
the ecosystems upon which they depend.65 The ESA, widely known as the
"pitbull" of environmental laws because of its broad-sweeping application
and stringent requirements, 66 prohibits any person from taking a listed spe-
cies 67 or adversely modifying occupied or otherwise essential habitat.68
With respect to federal actions, the ESA also requires consultation to en-
sure that the action is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
critical habitat.69
A. LISTING AND DESIGNATION OF CRITICAL HABITAT
The ESA authorizes the Secretaries of the Departments of Interior
and of Commerce, through the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and the
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"), to identify species in need of
its protections by placing them on the endangered or threatened species
list.7" Species eligible for listing as endangered are those which are in im-
minent danger of extinction,71 while threatened species are those which are
likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future.7"
The ESA also charges FWS with designating "critical habitat" for
64. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n,
588 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1978).
65. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
66. Adrian N. Hansen, The Endangered Species Act and Extinction of Reserved Indian Water
Rights on the San Juan River, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1995) (citing Robert D. Thornton,
Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 21 Envr.i L. 605 (1991). See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 174 (1978) [hereinafter TVA] (stating "Congress intended endangered species to be afforded
the highest of priorities," over and above the federal agencies' other statutory missions).
67. The ESA's coverage extends to fish, wildlife and plants. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). The Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for implementing its provisions with respect to wildlife,
plants and most fish species. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (1997). The National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice (NMFS) has authority for management of marine life and anadromous fish species, such as
salmon. Id. See 50 C.F.R. 17(2) (1997).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). For ease of reference, this article generally refers to FWS when
discussing the obligations of the wildlife agencies.
71. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). The statute provides "[t]he term 'endangered species' means
any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range
.... 11 Id.
72. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1994).
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listed species.73 Critical habitat is defined as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the
species, at the time it is listed.., on which are found those physical or
biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and
(II) which may require special management considerations or protec-
tion; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the spe-
cies at the time it is listed ... upon a determination by the Secretary
that such areas are essential for conservation of the species.74
The designation of critical habitat follows a statutorily mandated pro-
cess. FWS must first identify occupied or unoccupied but suitable areas
which meet the statutory criteria set forth above, based on the best scien-
tific data available.75 Second, FWS is to consider the economic and other
relevant impacts of designation for each area that fits within the defini-
tion.76 Finally, after considering economic and other relevant impacts, the
agency is to determine whether any identified areas should be excluded
from the final critical habitat designation because the "benefits of such ex-
clusion outweigh the benefits of [designation]. 77 Areas that meet the stat-
utory criteria may be excluded from the designation unless exclusion would
result in extinction of the species.78
B. THE STATUTE'S Two-PRONGED APPROACH TO
HABITAT PROTECTION
Once critical habitat is designated, a listed species enjoys a bipartite
system of protection. First, Section 9 of the ESA, which is immediately
triggered by the listing of the species, prevents harm to the species caused
by either direct action, such as hunting or harassing, or modifications to the
species' habitat which actually injure the species, even if the habitat has not
been designated as critical. Section 7(a)(2) provides an additional layer of
protection for activities with a federal nexus by requiring consultation to
prevent jeopardy to listed species or destruction or adverse modification of
critical habitat. Both Section 9 and Section 7 may delay, inhibit or prevent
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). Designation of critical habitat for endangered or threatened spe-
cies has been characterized as one of the "most costly and controversial classes of administrative
actions undertaken by the Service in administering the Act." Final Determination of Critical
Habitat for the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,129, 39,136 (1997).
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (mandating that designation
should occur concurrently with listing "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable"). A
recent proposal for amending the ESA, sponsored by Senator Kempthorne, would change the
timing of the critical habitat designation decision to allow the agency to delay final designation
for 30 months after listing or until adoption of a recovery plan. S. REP. No. 105-128, *13, 19 S.
1180, § 5(c), (n) (1997); 143 CONG. REc. S9411, 9414-15, 9416-17 (1997) [hereinafter Kempthorne
Bill].
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
76. Id. In contrast, FWS may not consider economics in the decision to list a species as
threatened or endangered, but must base that decision solely on the best scientific and commer-
cial data available. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
77. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
78. Id.
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development activities in Indian Country.79
1. The Prohibition Against "Take"
Section 9(a) prohibits the unauthorized "take" of a listed species by
any person.8" "Take" is defined as to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect . .8.1."I Section 9 does not expressly
apply to modification or destruction of critical habitat; however, because
the regulations defining "harm" include the adverse modification or degra-
dation of any habitat which "actually kills or injures" listed species, altera-
tion of occupied critical habitat would likely be a prohibited take.12
Liability for a take incidental to an otherwise lawful activity, such as agri-
culture or timber harvest, may be avoided by obtaining an incidental take
permit pursuant to Section 10.83
2. Section 7 Consultation Provisions as Applied to Critical Habitat
Section 7 of the ESA 84 requires each federal agency which authorizes,
funds, or executes any action, including approval of leases and permits, to
consult with FWS to ensure that the action is not likely to (1) jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species85 or (2)
result in the destruction or adverse modification of a listed species' critical
habitat.8 6 "Destruction or adverse modification" is defined as "a direct or
indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat
79. For further discussion see infra, Sections II.C.1 and IV.A.3 of this article. As noted
above, Section 7 applies to federal actions, including lease approvals. The Secretary of the Inte-
rior, through the BIA, must approve leases on Indian lands. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 415; 25 C.F.R.
§ 162.2 (1997). However, development of natural resources by the tribe itself, or an individual
member, would not necessarily require BIA approval or consultation unless federal funding or
some other federal nexus, such as a wetlands permit under Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344, were involved. Section 7 does apply to development on Indian lands the majority of the
time. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1481-83 (citing statistics regarding non-Indian grazing,
mining and waste disposal in Indian Country).
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). Violations can result in both civil and criminal penalties. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1540(a), 1540(b).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). To "take" also includes attempting to engage in such conduct. Id.
82. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697-700 (upholding Secretary's definition of "take" in 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.3, which defines harm as including acts which cause "significant habitat modification or deg-
radation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering"); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Lands and Natural
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that harm includes habitat modifications
which adversely affect the species).
83. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). See J.B. Ruhl, Sec-
tion 7(a) (1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped
Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENvTL. L. 1107, 1120-21 (1995) [herein-
after Untapped Power] (noting that Section 10 incidental take statements have been issued
infrequently).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). "Jeopardy" is defined as action "that reasonably would be ex-
pected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recov-
ery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that
species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1997). In comparison, while the take provision prevents activities
which affect an individual member of a species, the jeopardy provision focuses on the viability of
populations.
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
[Vol. 43
INDIAN LANDS AS CRITICAL HABITAT
for both the survival and recovery of a listed species."" The sweep of Sec-
tion 7's habitat provisions is thus broader than that of Section 9, as Section
7 reaches actions affecting either occupied or unoccupied critical habitat,
which, by its very definition, is valuable for survival or recovery of the
species.
Prior to undertaking an action or approving a lease or permit, the act-
ing agency is required to seek notice from FWS whether any listed species
may be present in the area of the proposed project. 88 If, through informal
consultation, the acting agency determines that the action is not likely to
adversely affect listed species or critical habitat, the consultation process is
terminated, and no further action is necessary.89
If a species or its habitat may be adversely affected by the action, how-
ever, the acting agency must engage in formal consultation to determine
the extent of any effects. 90 To initiate formal consultation, the acting
agency submits a biological assessment to FWS,91 and provides the "best
scientific and commercial data available" regarding the effects that an ac-
tion may have upon listed species or critical habitat. 92 FWS then issues a
biological opinion ("BO") detailing how the proposed agency action affects
species or their critical habitat. 93 The BO may suggest reasonable and pru-
dent alternatives which could be taken to avoid adverse effects in imple-
menting the action. 94 In addition, in the event that the taking of an
endangered or threatened species incidental to the proposed action is likely
to occur, but it will not jeopardize the species, FWS may issue an incidental
take statement allowing the action to proceed. 95 If the BO concludes that
no reasonable and prudent alternative will avoid jeopardy to the species or
destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat, the action may not
87. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1). See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 765 (9th Cir. 1985) (en-
joining development of Jersey Jack timber road because, although Forest Service was aware of
presence of endangered gray wolf, it failed to provide formal notice to FWS and failed to prepare
a biological assessment).
89. 50 C.F.R. § 402.13 (1997). See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(k)(1) (1997); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b)(1)
(1997) ("A Federal agency need not initiate formal consultation if, as a result of the preparation
of a biological assessment ... or as a result of informal consultation ..., the Federal agency
determines, with the written concurrence of the Director, that the proposed action is not likely to
adversely affect any listed species or critical habitat.").
90. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a).
91. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(c)(6). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.12 (describing requirements for biolog-
ical assessments).
92. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(d). Formal consultation is to conclude within 90 days after its initia-
tion. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(1)(A). It may, however, be extended for up to 60 days without the
consent of the applicant, and longer if the applicant agrees. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(e).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h). The Service is required to provide its bio-
logical opinion to the Federal agency and any applicant within 45 days of the conclusion of con-
sultation, but this time period may be suspended upon agreement of the applicant. 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14(e), (f).
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (1997). See also Ramsey v. Kantor, 96
F.3d 434, 440-46 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining statutory requirements and upholding Section 7 inci-
dental take statement for the Columbia River Fish Management Plan); Untapped Power, supra
note 83, at 1120-21 (describing and comparing incidental take provisions of Sections 7 and 10).
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go forward.96
C. THE ESA's APPLICATION TO INDIAN LANDS AND RESOURCES
The trust relationship encompasses a two-fold obligation with respect
to wildlife and its habitat. Fiduciary duties extend not only to the environ-
mental integrity of the reservation land base and to wildlife resources, on-
and off-reservation, 97 but also to tribal sovereignty and utilization of reser-
vation resources to promote the economic well-being of Indian Nations.98
These dual responsibilities are sometimes difficult to harmonize.
The ESA implicates both aspects of the trust obligation. Sections 7
and 9, which are designed to preserve listed species, may protect tribal
wildlife resources, but, at the same time, these two provisions can curtail or
prevent the use of listed species and its habitat. Meanwhile, the critical
habitat requirements of the ESA, which are also aimed at promoting the
conservation of listed species, have significant effects on the use and enjoy-
ment of Indian lands and resources while providing only minimal protec-
tion for the integrity of either the reservation environment or the species
itself.
1. The ESA's Implications for Reservation Resources
It is not at all unusual for tribal economic development plans to be
frustrated by the constraints of the ESA. 99 The ESA's critical habitat pro-
visions bring the statute's potential conflict with tribal interests into sharp
focus. The most obvious result of designation is the delay, curtailment or
prohibition of development activities under Section 7's consultation and
jeopardy provisions.100
But there are more subtle impacts that can be equally detrimental to
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). See TVA, 437 U.S. at 184 (applying Act to Tellico Dam). The
statute provides an exception for activities which are granted an exemption by the Endangered
Species Committee, commonly known as the "God Squad." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e), (h). This provi-
sion has been invoked infrequently, see Gail L. Achterman, Reflections on Owls, Salmon and
Suckers: Current Developments under the Endangered Species Act, 38 ROCKY MNT. MIN. L. INST.
5-1, 5-23 (1992). Furthermore, exemptions are rarely granted. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS,
ET AL, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 806 (3d ed. 1993).
97. See Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relation-
ship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1066-75
(1997) [hereinafter Bilateralism] (citing Memorandum Summarizing Tribal Workshop on the En-
dangered Species Act 2 (Feb. 20, 1996)); Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 795 (recognizing trust
duty to protect "Federal lands and habitats which support the resources upon which meaningful
exercise of tribal hunting and fishing rights depend, and [administer] Federal projects in a manner
which prevents the diminishment of associated fish and wildlife resources, and the tribal share in
them") (citing Memorandum from Ada Deer, Ass't Secretary for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of
Interior, to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks 4 (June 23, 1994)).
98. For further discussion, see supra Section I.B.2 of this article.
99. See TVA, 437 U.S. at 153. Even if no jeopardy is ultimately found, projects can be
delayed for at least 180 days while a biological assessment is prepared and, if formal consultation
is required, for an additional 90 days or more. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(1)(A), (c)(1); 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14(d)-(e).
100. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 240. For a discussion of designations' impacts on tribal
economic activities resulting from the Mexican Spotted Owl and San Juan River fish species
designations, see Section IV.A.3, infra.
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trust resources. Designation can adversely affect other aspects of the phys-
ical environment, and even, at times, the targeted species itself. Designa-
tion can preclude preventative management measures, such as flood
control and silvicultural treatment for fire, disease and insect infestation,
which, in turn, may result in harm to non-targeted wildlife and fish spe-
cies.101 In addition, designation sometimes imperils the very species it is
intended to protect by alerting a landowner to its presence.
10 2
In fact, FWS itself has determined that the designation of critical
habitat "provides little or no conservation benefit despite the great cost to
put it in place." 103 FWS has stated:
Over 20 years of experience in designating critical habitat and
applying it as a tool in conserving species leads the Service to seri-
ously question its utility and the value it provides in comparison to
the monetary, administrative, and other resources it absorbs...
[T]he Service believes that critical habitat is not an efficient or ef-
fective means of securing the conservation of species.104
FWS's actions speak as loudly as its words when it comes to critical habitat
- in the face of budget shortfalls, FWS has given the designation of critical
habitat the lowest priority among the Service's various listing activities.
10 5
The actual listing of the species itself, with its attendant prohibitions on
species jeopardy and on takes, including habitat modifications which di-
rectly harm a species, provides far greater protection than critical habitat
designation.10 6 In addition, there are other, more effective tools available
under the ESA, including recovery plans, land exchanges and habitat con-
servation plans.1"7 Yet, in spite of the de minimis conservation benefit and
the detrimental impact on tribal sovereignty, property interests and eco-
nomic development, Indian lands continue to be included in critical habitat
designations.10 8
101. See Catron County v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 75 F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that the impact of designation, which would preclude flood control efforts,
would be "immediate and ... disastrous"); Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5, 1 26-27, 29
(alleging that designation could curtail fire management efforts and impair "wildlife habitat crea-
tion activities"). But see Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 698 (1996) (holding that NEPA analysis was not required for a designation decision, in part
because it was an "environmentally beneficial" action).
102. See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1995), mod'd on other grounds,
967 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (upholding FWS's refusal to designate critical habitat for grizzly
bear on grounds that designation could lead to a backlash and jeopardize bear recovery).
103. 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,130.
104. Id. at 39,131 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 39,130 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 64,475 (1996)).
106. Id. at 39,131-32. FWS does note that designation "may provide some benefits to a species
by identifying areas important to the species' conservation, particularly until a recovery plan is
adopted, including habitat that is not presently occupied and that may require restoration efforts
to support recovery." Id. at 39,132. It concludes, however, that these benefits are minor. Id.
107. See id. at 39,130-32. See also Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994)
(recovery plans); 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (habitat conservation plans); 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (land ac-
quisition and exchange).
108. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,135 (including Indian lands in Southwest Willow Flycatcher
designation).
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2. The ESA Does Not Abrogate Indian Treaty Rights
In spite of its breadth and the stringency of its provisions, the ESA
does not take precedence over solemn obligations embodied in treaties
with Indian Nations, nor does it excuse federal agencies from fulfilling their
trust responsibilities. Although statutes of general application, such as the
ESA and many environmental laws, apply to Indians in Indian Country
when their purpose requires "national or uniform application,"' 10 9 tribal ac-
tivities will be excluded from the law if its application would de facto abro-
gate treaty rights. 110 There is a strong presumption against implied
abrogation. A federal statute will not be construed to abrogate Indian
treaty rights unless there is clear evidence that Congress was actually aware
of the treaty rights and consciously chose to abrogate them.11
Courts look first to the face of the statute for an express statement of
congressional intent to abrogate." If there is no such statement, "compel-
ling" evidence in the legislative history may suffice:
We have required that Congress' intention to abrogate Indian treaty
rights be clear and plain. . . . Absent explicit statutory language, we
have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of
treaty rights .... We do not construe statutes as abrogating treaty
rights in a backhanded way... Indian treaty rights are too fundamen-
tal to be easily cast aside.1 13
In spite of the ESA's seemingly unambiguous and unequivocal appli-
cation to "any person," '14 there is no explicit provision on the face of the
ESA which evidences a congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty
109. Federal Power Comm'n, 362 U.S. at 118-20 (Federal Power Act applies to Indian lands
due to comprehensive purpose of Act).
110. Id. The prohibition against de facto abrogation is one of three exceptions to the principle
that laws of general application apply to tribes. In addition, general laws will not apply to tribes if
they impact essential tribal affairs. One court noted, "Indian tribes retain exclusive jurisdiction
over essential matters of reservation government, in the absence of specific Congressional limita-
tion." United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981)
(citing Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1003 (1970)). See also United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (domestic relations); Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899) (inheritance rules); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56
(1978) (tribal membership). Finally, general laws do not apply to tribes if it can be shown that
Congress intended the law not to apply to Indians on their reservations. Farris, 624 F.2d at 894.
111. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) [hereinafter Dion I]. The presumption
applies when generally applicable legislation infringes on specifically granted treaty rights, such
as rights to hunt and fish on usual and accustomed grounds, and rights to undisturbed or exclusive
use of Indian lands. See Farris, 624 F.2d at 893 (general treaty language such as that devoting
land to a tribe's "exclusive use" does not preclude federal regulation of gaming, although it does
"suffice to oust state jurisdiction").
112. Dion I, 476 U.S. at 739.
113. Id. at 739-40 (emphasis added) (citing Washington v. Washington Commercial Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessel Ass'n]; Menominee Tribe v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968)). See Winnebago Tribe, 542 F.2d at 1006 (Flood Control
Act of 1944, providing for development of the Missouri River basin, did not authorize the Corps
of Engineers to unilaterally abrogate a treaty by taking tribal treaty lands by eminent domain).
To find abrogation there must be "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict
on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty." Dion I, 476 U.S. at 739-40. See generally COHEN, supra note 14, at 221-25.
114. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994). "Person" is defined
broadly to include federal, state and foreign governments and any "entity subject to the jurisdic-
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rights." 5 Neither the Supreme Court nor any Circuit Court of Appeals has
definitively ruled that the ESA's restrictions apply to Indian tribes engag-
ing in activities protected by treaties. In fact, the only Circuit Court to
squarely address the issue held, in United States v. Dion,1 6 that the ESA
does not abrogate treaty rights. On appeal, the Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to reach the ESA issue, because it determined that the Bald
Eagle Protection Act'" 7 abrogated existing treaty rights to hunt or take
protected eagles.' 18 The Court found that a specific section of that Act,
which provided that the Secretary of the Interior may allow Indians to take
eagles by permit for religious purposes, set forth clear evidence of Con-
gress' intent that unpermitted, unauthorized takings would not be allowed,
treaty rights notwithstanding.119
By contrast, the sole reference to American Indian interests in the
ESA is a single subsection which provides an exemption from the takings
prohibition for Native Alaskans and non-native permanent residents of
Alaska Native villages if the taking is "primarily for subsistence pur-
poses.' '120 This provision sheds no light on the abrogation inquiry because
the legal framework applicable to Native Alaskan rights and relationship
with the United States is markedly different than that of the tribes in the
contiguous United States. Native Alaskans have not entered into treaties
with the United States government, given Alaska's unique history and re-
moteness.' 2 ' Indeed, one of the few courts to address the issue found that
"[t]o treat the consideration of indigenous Alaskans' rights as the consider-
ation of Native American treaty rights nationwide, for the simple reason
that both groups are regarded as Indians, is disingenuous. "122
tion of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13). The statutory definition does not, however,
expressly include American Indians or Indian tribes.
115. See Sally J. Johnson, Honoring Treaty Rights and Conserving Endangered Species after
United States v. Dion, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 179 (1992); Robert J. Miller, Comment, Speaking
with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered Species Act, 70 OR. L. REV.
543 (1991) (discussing ESA's application to hunting and fishing rights protected by treaty).
116. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1264-65 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) [hereinafter Dion
II] (holding that the ESA did not abrogate Dion's treaty right to hunt on the Yankton Sioux
Indian Reservation), rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).117. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44.
118. Dion I, 476 U.S. at 745. Because the Eagle Protection Act abrogated Dion's right to hunt
eagles, the Court found that the treaty provided no defense to the ESA prosecution. Id.
119. Id. at 740 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1985)). See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (regulations governing
permits).
120. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994).
121. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 911-17 (discussing Alaska Native possession, set-
tlement by non-natives and Alaska's entry into the Union in 1958, and the enactment of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (1986), under which claims to aborig-
inal title were extinguished in exchange for land selection rights).
122. United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 663 (D. Minn. 1991). Contrary to Bresette,
one earlier district court opinion held that the ESA does abrogate tribal treaty rights to take
protected species, relying on the Alaska native exception and the broad scope of the statutory
definition of "person." See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (upholding
conviction for taking endangered Florida panther). Neither of these provisions, singularly or
together, meet Dion's stringent requirements for an unambiguous expression of intent to abro-
gate on the face of the statute or "compelling" evidence of such intent in the legislative history.
In fact, the Bresette court flatly rejected Billie's conclusion, finding that the Florida court's rea-
1998]
SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Just as there is no language of abrogation on the face of the ESA itself,
the ESA's legislative history contains no evidence, much less "clear and
plain" evidence, that Congress actually considered Indian treaty rights and
chose to abrogate them."2 3 Accordingly, under the rubric of Dion, the
ESA should not be construed as abrogating tribal rights to utilize Indian
lands and resources. 24
3. The Conservation Principles
Even though the ESA does not abrogate treaty rights, arguably, re-
strictions may be placed on tribal activities under the statute if necessary
for conservation of a species. The conservation exception, which was first
enunciated in Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Washington, 25 is typi-
cally applied to a state's regulation of Indian hunting and fishing rights held
"in common" with other citizens.1 26 The conservation standard allows state
regulation of tribal fish and game resources if the restriction is: (1) reason-
able and necessary for species preservation; (2) the least restrictive alterna-
tive; (3) non-discriminatory, both facially and as applied; and (4) the tribe's
soning was simply unpersuasive. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 663. See also Miller, supra note 115, at
569 (arguing that the Billie court improperly "discarded the Dion test in favor of a more liberal
test built on a series of inferences").
123. See Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 663. See also Johnson, supra note 115, at 187-88 (discussing
legislative history of ESA and Congress' subsequent failure to amend the statute to address In-
dian treaty rights, and concluding that Congress did not intend to abrogate). Congress did, how-
ever, reject a subsistence exception as well as a blanket exemption for "American Indians,
Aleuts, and Eskimos" during its deliberations on the ESA. See H.R. 13081 § 5(a)(2), 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1972); S. 3199, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 1461, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). That
American Indians were considered in tandem with Native Alaskans only reinforces the argument
that Congress failed to consider treaty rights. See n.121, supra, and text.
124. See Dion II, 752 F.2d at 1270. See also Miller, supra note 115, at 567; Johnson, supra note
115, at 188. For contrasting views, see Regis-Civetta, supra note 6, at 344-45, and a pre-Dion
Department of Interior opinion entitled Application of The Endangered Species Act to Native
Americans with Treaty Hunting and Fishing Rights, 87 Int. Dec. 525 (Nov. 4, 1980). Professor
Coggins, in one of the earliest articles to address the application of the ESA and other federal
wildlife statutes to treaty tribes, argues that the ESA modifies treaty-based activities, particularly
hunting or otherwise directly taking listed species. George Cameron Coggins & William
Modrcin, Native American Indians and Federal Wildlife Law, 31 STANFORD L. REV. 375 (1978).
Coggins' pre-Dion analysis is based on the Alaska Native exemption and its legislative history
and the intended breadth and comprehensive nature of the statute. Id. at 404-05. Although the
Supreme Court's subsequent guidance on implied abrogation could quite possibly alter this as-
sessment - neither the Alaska exemption nor the scope of the statute rise to the level of clear
and plain evidence of a congressional intent to displace treaty rights - Coggins' ultimate recom-
mendation is still sound. He proposes that conservation objectives for imperiled species can be
harmonized with treaty rights in a manner not dissimilar to that advanced by the Secretarial
Order on Tribal Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endangered Species. If direct conflict is inevi-
table, for example, where a treaty guarantees a right to hunt or fish a severely depleted listed
species, action could be taken to preserve the species, but treaty Indians must be given priority in
the allocation or regulation of the species. Id. at 415, 421-23.
125. 391 U.S. 392 (1968) [hereinafter Puyallup I].
126. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 658; Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392; Dep't of Game of Wash-
ington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) [hereinafter Puyallup II]. See also Clinton Critique,
supra note 21, at 778-79; Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 664. The Puyallup cases addressed a continuing
dispute between Pacific Northwest tribes and the State of Washington over treaty fishing rights to
anadromous fish species. In Puyallup II, Justice Douglas, upholding Indian rights to commercial
net fishing, stated that the State's police power "is adequate to prevent the steelhead from follow-
ing the fate of the passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians the federal right to
pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets." Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 49.
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own conservation measures do not achieve the conservation purpose.127 A
fifth conservation principle has been embraced at various times and with
varying degrees of enthusiasm by the Department of the Interior under the
Clinton Administration, but has not gained wide judicial recognition: re-
strictions of tribal activities may be imposed only if regulation of non-In-
dian activities do not accomplish conservation.128
The issues raised by state fish and game codes and the ESA's restric-
tions on takings and jeopardy are at least somewhat analogous, in that both
strive to conserve wildlife resources. 12 9 The conservation exception, devel-
oped to place parameters on state efforts to regulate tribal activities, may
therefore be useful in examining whether federal restrictions on tribal ac-
tivities are appropriate. 30 Yet the conservation principles alone, even if
127. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (D. Wash. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). See also United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d
277, 279 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting that "only upon a finding of necessity, irreparable harm and the
absence of effective Indian tribal self-regulation" may the State regulate gill-net fishing in the
Great Lakes).
128. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 793. The fifth principle, which entails an equitable
distribution of economic and environmental benefits and burdens, is adopted as a matter of policy
in the Secretarial Order on Tribal Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endangered Species, see
discussion, infra at Section III(B)-(C), but research reveals no judicial precedent explicitly requir-
ing that this fifth principle be fulfilled before regulations may be imposed on tribes. Arguably,
however, a failure to regulate non-Indian activities before restricting Indian activities would of-
fend the third principle - regulations must be non-discriminatory.
129. State regulation of wildlife resources does not stem from title to the wildlife, but instead
from the state's police powers. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (dismissing state's
justification for regulation of wildlife resources within its borders under the theory of ownership
of the resource as mere fiction; instead, wildlife is held in a trust capacity for the benefit of all
citizens). The "public trust" doctrine may also justify state intervention in wildlife management.
See id.; Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475, 478 (1970) [hereinafter Doctrine]; Joseph L. Sax, The
Search for Environmental Rights, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 104 (1990) [hereinafter Rights];
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 426 n.6, 464 (1989) [hereinafter Headwaters]
(noting that the public trust duty for navigable water bodies extends to fisheries). While the
federal government has public trust responsibilities as well, the federal government generally
asserts authority over imperiled wildlife species under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995,
999 (D. Hawaii 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (ESA's prohibition on habitat destruc-
tion upheld under Treaty and Commerce Clauses; court noted in dicta that federal property inter-
ests might also justify restrictions for the benefit of wildlife); Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d
620, 624-27 (9th Cir. 1938). See generally George Cameron Coggins, Wildlife and the Constitution:
The Walls Come Tumbling Down, 55 WASH. L. REV. 295 (1980).
130. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1071-72. During the Clinton Administration, several
federal agencies have indicated their acceptance of the conservation principles to govern their
own conduct. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Framework for Treaty Tribe Harvest of
Pacific Groundfish and 1996 Makah Whiting Allocation, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,786, 28,791-92 (1996)
(following principles pursuant to Judge Rothstein's order in Makah Indian Tribe v. Brown, No.
C85-1606R, Civil No. 9213-Phase I, Subproceeding No. 92-1, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 29,
1993) ([the] Secretary must accord treaty fishers the opportunity to take 50% of the harvestable
surplus of halibut in their usual and accustomed grounds, and the harvestable surplus must be
determined according to the conservation necessity principles."); U.S. Department of Agriculture
Forest Service and U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, Record of
Decision for Amendments to Land Management Planning Documents Within the Range of the
Northern Spotted Owl 54-55 (Apr. 13, 1994) (copy on file with author) (adopting all five conser-
vation principles for actions on federal public lands that impact treaty resources). See also Cog-
gins & Modrcin, supra note 129, at 415, 419-23 (arguing that federal conservation requirements,
such as those imposed by the ESA, should be interpreted as modifying treaty rights).
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the fifth principle were also required, may not fully reflect the federal trust
responsibility to tribes - a responsibility which has no state counterpart.
If the trust obligation were to be defined by the conservation principles,
which are used in determining when treaty resources may be regulated, not
to review whether a breach of trust has occurred, an affirmative federal
obligation could be transmuted "into the lowest echelon of permissible fed-
eral conduct."'' In other words, the trust responsibility is not met simply
by ensuring that treaty rights are not abrogated by federal regulation.
More specifically, the conservation principles, developed to govern the
harvest of fish and game, do not necessarily justify the designation of criti-
cal habitat and curtailment of tribal development activities in Indian Coun-
try for two reasons. First, the conservation principles are generally applied
to Indian activities which affect resources held "in common" with other
citizens. 3 While usufructuary rights to wildlife resources may be held in
common with others, the reservation land itself - which necessarily in-
cludes wildlife habitat - is held in trust for the exclusive and undisturbed
use of the tribes.
Secondly, regulation of Indian development is not acceptable, as a
matter of distributive justice, 33 unless the conservation burden is equitably
distributed. The conservation burden has not been evenly distributed when
it comes to the designation of critical habitat in Indian Country. In fact,
while non-Indian industry has enjoyed the economic benefits of decades of
extractive enterprises, degrading habitat which may have otherwise been
suitable for ESA designation, tribal enterprises have only recently become
positioned to take advantage of natural resources on Indian lands. Mean-
while, because Indian lands are generally less developed than surrounding
areas, they have become enclaves of wildlife habitat which feel the brunt of
the ESA's conservation restrictions more heavily than non-Indian lands
and activities.13 4
131. Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 794. Treaties represent the "outer bounds of permissi-
ble agency regulation" while the trust responsibility goes further, providing an affirmative duty to
protect tribal resources. Id. For an argument that a federal agency's application of the conserva-
tion principles in the ESA context to qualify Indian hunting and fishing rights would result in de
facto abrogation and "undermine the firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-government,"
see Johnson, supra note 115, at 191-92.
132. See Bresette, 761 F. Supp. at 664 (citing Puyallup I, 391 U.S. at 398); Washington, 384 F.
Supp. at 333, 342-43 (holding that treaty tribes had an unrestricted right to fish on-reservation but
that off-reservation activities could be regulated by the state, absent adequate tribal regulation, if
necessary for conservation). See also Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Washington, 433 U.S.
165 (1977) [hereinafter Puyallup III] (applying the conservation principles to tribe's exclusive on-
reservation fishing rights). In dissent, Justice Brennan observed that the effect of this holding
must be limited to the unique facts of the case, involving more than fourteen years of litigation
over migratory fish runs and the discovery, late in the litigation, that the reservation had not in
fact been extinguished, as formerly believed. Id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Distributive justice promotes the equitable distribution of economic and environmental
benefits and burdens through the law. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 241 n.82.
134. For a discussion providing more detail and including specific examples, see infra, Section
IV.A.3. See also Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 770. Wood borrowed the words of Jerry
Meninock, a member of the Yakima Tribal Council, to describe non-Indians' concept of conserva-
tion: "the white man's progress had diminished the fish runs, and therefore, the Indians had to
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Accordingly, the conservation standards should be used as guiding
principles for federal designation and management of critical habitat only if
steps are taken to redistribute the conservation burden in a manner which
prioritizes tribal trust resources above other general statutory require-
ments. If the standards, including the equitable distribution principle, are
employed in tandem with procedural safeguards which ensure meaningful
government-to-government consultation, both the wildlife resource and the
reservation resource will benefit.
III. THE SECRETARIAL ORDER
A. SETTING THE STAGE
The Secretarial Order on Tribal Rights, Trust Responsibilities and En-
dangered Species ("Order") was issued by the Departments of Commerce
and Interior on June 5, 1997, as the culmination of months of negotiations
between high-level agency officials and tribal representatives, and over a
year of work on the part of tribal representatives and organizations. 135 Its
overarching theme is to "harmonize" the federal trust responsibility to
tribes and the statutory missions of the Departments in implementing the
ESA. 13 6 The Order attempts to effectuate the general policy that the De-
partments and their agencies carry out their responsibilities "in a manner
that ... strives to ensure that Indian tribes do not bear a disproportionate
burden for the conservation of listed species, so as to avoid or minimize
the potential for conflict and confrontation.' '1 37
Notably, a tribal initiative provided the impetus for the Order - un-
like most federal Indian policies, the Order was not generated by central-
ized federal decision making and handed down to the tribes.138  Tribes
stop fishing to protect what was left." Id. (citing Hearings before the Columbia River Fisheries
Task Force (Oct. 28, 1992)).
135. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1066-75 (describing the efforts of inter-tribal work-
shops and working groups to develop a position paper on ESA issues to be presented to Secretary
of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt). See also Government Defers to Tribes Under Endangered Species,
OJIBwE NEWS, June 13, 1997, at 2.
136. Secretarial Order § 1; Appendix § 2(A)(2).
137. Secretarial Order § 1. Similarly, Appendix § 3(B)(5) provides that, when exercising au-
thority for threatened species under ESA § 4(d), the agencies shall "avoid or minimize effects on
tribal management or economic development ... to the maximum extent allowed by law." Id.
138. Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1063. Professor Wilkinson noted that, procedurally, the
Order "serves as one major example of how the government-to-government relationship between
the United States and Indian tribes can be successfully implemented." Id. The Order is unique
among executive-branch orders on Indian affairs, not only because its impetus came from Indian
Country but also because (1) it resulted from negotiations between high-level representatives
from the federal team and Indian Country, with the aid of technical advisors, (2) bilateral proto-
cols for the negotiations were adopted at the outset, and (3) adequate time was set aside for
participants to understand the relevant cultural, historical and legal background. Id. at 1077-78.
Professor Wilkinson described the importance of this process:
The detailed education about tribal issues allowed the federal negotiators,
most of whom had previously spent little time on Indian matters, to understand
the true distinctiveness of Indian policy: the depth of commitment of Indian peo-
ple to preserve and protect tribal sovereignty, their homelands, the trust relation-
ship, and Indian culture. With that in mind, the federal negotiators were able to
see the tribal positions with new eyes.
1998]
SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
came together to propose ESA policy as a result of numerous concerns.
Time was of the essence, because proposals to amend the ESA were pend-
ing in Congress, and reauthorization seemed imminent.139  If the tribes
failed to assert a position, other interests, including environmentalists, in-
dustry, and the states, would likely adopt and advocate their own contra-
dictory positions on reauthorization without tribal input.14°  Further,
enforcement of the ESA's requirements in Indian Country had resulted in
increasingly troubling conflicts with hunting and fishing treaty rights, reli-
gious activities and economic development of Indian lands. 141 In addition,
tribal sovereignty and self-determination were being undermined by the
application of the ESA's restrictions to tribal activities and lands.1 42 Fi-
nally, the ESA's pressures to manage lands for a single species were viewed
as conflicting with tribal policies of holistic, integrated resource manage-
ment. 143 The Order was crafted to address these concerns.
B. THE ORDER'S PROVISIONS
Pervasive throughout the Order's provisions is the acknowledgment
that tribal governments are sovereigns over Indian lands,1 4 and that, with
respect to federal decisions which may affect tribal resources, consultation
with tribes on a government-to-government basis is a critical component of
the trust relationship. 45  The Order directs the Departments to comply
with the following principles in an effort to fulfill the sovereignty objective:
(1) work directly with tribes on a government-to-government basis to pro-
mote healthy ecosystems; (2) recognize that Indian lands are not subject to
the same controls as federal public lands; (3) assist tribes in developing and
expanding tribal programs to promote healthy ecosystems without the need
Id. at 1079.
139. See id. at 1065 n.6 (citing Endangered Species Conservation and Management Act of
1995, H.R. 2275, 104th Cong. (1995)). The ESA was to be reauthorized in 1992, but reauthoriza-
tion has yet to occur. Although H.R. 2275 did not pass, proposals to amend the ESA continue to
draw the attention of Congress. See Kempthorne Bill, supra note 74. Concerns regarding eco-
nomics and impacts to private property rights seem to be the driving force behind most of the
proposals. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 265 and n.235; Erin Kelly, Congress to Debate Major
Environmental Measures Next Year, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 1997, at A9. See also Untapped
Power, supra note 83, at 1137 (noting that the ESA has been the "whipping boy of property rights
advocates").
140. Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1066.
141. See id. at 1065 (noting that "[a]lthough the environmental impacts had been created by
non-Indian development, the tribes were facing considerable pressure from ESA enforcement
over matters such as timber harvesting, building construction, water development, and salmon
harvesting."). See also Tsosie, supra note 46, at 240.
142. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 232, 240-41.
143. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1068-69. See also Tsosie, supra note 46, at 274-76, 286-
87.
144. See, e.g., Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 1 ("Departments ... shall view tribal governments
as sovereign entities with authority and responsibility for the health and welfare of ecosystems on
Indian lands").
145. See, e.g., Secretarial Order § 4, § 5, princ. 1 and 3; Appendix § 3. At the signing cere-
mony, Secretary Babbitt stated: "For too long we have failed to recognize the needs of Indian
tribes to be consulted and part of the process from the beginning, and the traditional knowledge
they can share about species, habitat and conservation." Government Defers to Tribes Under
Endangered Species, supra note 135, at 2.
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for conservation restrictions; (4) consider impacts on Indian use of listed
species for cultural and religious purposes; and, finally, (5) make informa-
tion available and facilitate the exchange of information related to tribal
trust resources and Indian lands by protecting tribal information from
disclosure. 46
The Order is accompanied by an Appendix which provides more de-
tailed guidance for the agencies' implementation of the Order.147 Its stated
purpose is to provide policy to the Services' national, regional and field
offices regarding the on-the-ground implementation of the Order.148 The
Appendix is to be "considered an integral part" of the Order.149
The Order itself makes only one explicit reference to critical habitat:
"[n]othing in this Order shall be applied to authorize [directed] take of
listed species, or any activity that would jeopardize the continued existence
of any listed species or destroy or adversely modify designated critical
habitat."' 0 The Appendix, however, provides the procedural safeguards
of early notification,"' information exchange 152 and meaningful tribal par-
ticipation during the designation process. a53 Substantively, the Appendix
prioritizes tribal interests by stating:
[i]n keeping with the trust responsibility, [the agencies] shall consult
with the affected Indian tribe(s) when considering the designation of
critical habitat in an area that may impact tribal trust resources, tri-
146. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 1-5. The Order recognizes that information provided by
Indian Nations during the consultation process may be confidential, and strives to keep it that
way. This was articulated by the following: "[in the course of the mutual exchange of informa-
tion, the Departments shall protect, to the maximum extent practicable, tribal information which
has been disclosed to or collected by the Departments." Id. § 5, princ. 5.
147. Appendix § 1.
148. Id. The Departments have been directed to begin a training program for employees re-
garding implementation of the Order pursuant to the Appendix. See Bilateralism, supra note 97,
at 1083.
149. Appendix § 1.
150. Secretarial Order § 2(D).
151. See Appendix § 3(B)(2). The Appendix states: the agencies shall coordinate and "en-
courage meaningful tribal participation" and "[r]ecognize the right of Indian tribes to participate
fully.., by providing timely notification to, soliciting information and comments from, and utiliz-
ing the expertise of, Indian tribes whose exercise of tribal rights or tribal trust resources could be
affected ... [by a decision to propose or issue final rules] (ii) to designate critical habitat .... " Id.
152. See Appendix § 3(B)(3). The Appendix provides that agencies shall: "[riecognize the
contribution to be made by affected tribes, throughout the process and prior to finalization and
close of the public comment period, in the review of proposals to designate critical habitat and
evaluate economic impacts of such proposals with implications for tribal trust resources or the
exercise of tribal rights" and shall notify tribes and the BIA and solicit information on "tribal
cultural values, reserved hunting, fishing, gathering, and other Indian rights or tribal economic
development for use in the preparation of (i) economic analyses involving impacts on tribal com-
munities; and (ii) the preparation of 'balancing tests' to determine appropriate exclusions from
critical habitat .... " See also Appendix § 3(C)(1), (D)(1). The Appendix further provides that
agencies shall: "[flacilitate the Services' use of the best available scientific and commercial data
by soliciting information, traditional knowledge, and comments from, and utilizing the expertise
of, affected Indian tribes. in the Section 7 consultation and habitat conservation planning
processes. Id.
153. See Appendix § 3(B)(4). FWS and NMFS, "[i]n keeping with the trust responsibility,
shall consult with the affected Indian tribe(s) when considering the designation of critical habitat
in an area that may impact tribal trust resources, tribally-owned fee lands, or the exercise of tribal
rights." Id. See also Appendix § 3(B)(2).
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bally-owned fee lands, or the exercise of tribal rights. Critical habitat
shall not be designated in such areas unless it is determined essential to
conserve a listed species. In designating critical habitat, the Services
shall evaluate and document the extent to which the conservation
needs of the listed species can be achieved by limiting the designation
to other lands.15 4
With respect to habitat modifications which could result in incidental
takings, the Order adopts the conservation principles, along with the stan-
dard requiring equitable distribution of burdens, by directing the agencies
to give notice that:
(i) the restriction is reasonable and necessary for conservation of the
species at issue; (ii) the conservation purpose of the restriction cannot
be achieved by reasonable regulation of non-Indian activities; (iii) the
measure is the least restrictive alternative available to achieve the re-
quired conservation purpose; (iv) the restriction does not discrimi-
nate against Indian activities, either as stated or applied; and, (v)
voluntary tribal measures are not adequate to achieve the necessary
conservation purpose.
155
The agencies are to provide assistance for the development of tribal
conservation plans,156 and, when such plans are in place, they should be
given deference.157 In addition, the Appendix advances the Clinton Ad-
ministration's policy of promoting cooperative conservation tools, such as
habitat conservation plans,'158 by encouraging the use of intergovernmental
154. Appendix § 3(B)(4) (emphasis added).
155. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(C) (emphasis added). In comparison, if a tribal activity
which could result in a direct take would be restricted, "meaningful government-to-government
consultation shall occur, in order to strive to harmonize the federal trust responsibility to the
tribes, tribal sovereignty and the statutory missions of the Departments." Id. In either case, if
the Departments "determine that conservation restrictions are necessary in order to protect listed
species, the Departments... shall consult with affected tribes and provide written notice to them
of the intended restriction [on the tribal activity] as far in advance as practicable." Id. For a
discussion of conservation standards, see supra Section II.C.3.
156. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(A). The order states, "Departments shall offer and pro-
vide such scientific and technical assistance and information as may be available for the develop-
ment of tribal conservation and management plans to promote the maintenance, restoration,
enhancement and health of the ecosystems upon which sensitive species (including candidate,
proposed, and listed species) depend .... " Id. See also id., princ. 3(C). In addition, Depart-
ments "shall promptly notify" affected tribes that federal conservation restrictions are being con-
sidered for any species, and shall "provide such technical, financial, or other assistance as may be
appropriate, thereby assisting Indian tribes in identifying and implementing tribal conservation
and other measures necessary to protect such species." Id.
157. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(B). The Order provides that "Departments shall give def-
erence to tribal conservation and management plans for tribal trust resources that (a) govern
activities on Indian lands, including, for the purposes of this section, tribally-owned fee lands, and
(b) address the conservation needs of listed species." Id. With respect to the consultation re-
quirements in ESA § 7, "tribal conservation and management plans for tribal trust resources that
govern activities on Indian lands, including ... tribally-owned fee lands, shall serve as the basis
for developing any reasonable and prudent alternatives [to activities which would jeopardize a
listed species or adversely modify its critical habitat], to the extent practicable." Appendix
3(C)(3)(a). The Appendix also provides that: "The Services shall make a written determination
describing (i) how the selected [reasonable and prudent] alternative is consistent with their trust
responsibilities, and (ii) the extent to which tribal conservation and management plans for af-
fected tribal trust resources can be incorporated into any such alternative." Appendix
§ 3(C)(3)(d).
158. See ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. 1536(b)(4) (1994); ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(1)(2) (1994). See
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agreements for management of multi-jurisdictional ecosystems and conser-
vation of sensitive and listed species. 15 9
Although the Order and Appendix, taken together, promote tribal in-
terests in sovereignty and utilization of natural resources, a primary short-
coming of the Order, from the perspective of the participating tribal
representatives, is that it begs the fundamental question of whether the
ESA should apply to tribal activities in the first place.160  Another per-
ceived defect is its failure to recognize an affirmative trust responsibility to
restore habitat degraded by non-Indian development.16 1 Moreover, several
of the Order's provisions, including those which give tribes the power to
regulate, do not apply to fee lands within reservation boundaries. 62 In
also Jon Margolis, Critics Say "No Surprises" Means No Protection, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug.
4, 1997, at 10 (noting that HCP's have become "one of the most prominent tools" used under the
ESA; while only 14 existed before 1993, there are now "211 in full effect and another 200 in the
works"); Thomas Jackson, Lessons from the Endangered Species Wars, 12 NAT. REs. & ENV'T
105, 109 (1997) (citing Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62
Fed. Reg. 32,189 (1997)). See also Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 437 (concluding that Section 7 incidental
take statement ("ITS") may be issued for non-federal participants in the Columbia River Fish
Management Plan); Swan View Coalition v. Babbitt, No. 96-172-M-DWM (D. Mont. Oct. 14,
1997) (copy on file with author) (upholding conservation agreement and Section 7 ITS between
Fish and Wildlife Service, State of Montana and Plum Creek Timber Company for management
of checkerboard lands in grizzly bear habitat).
159. See Appendix § 2(E). The Appendix states, "In keeping with the Services' initiatives to
promote voluntary conservation partnerships for listed species and the ecosystems upon which
they depend, the Services shall consult on a government-to-government basis with the affected
tribe to determine and provide appropriate assurances that would otherwise be provided to a
non-Indian." Id. The Appendix continues, "Departments shall ... pursue intergovernmental
agreements to formalize arrangements involving sensitive species ... such as, but not limited to,
land and resource management .... Such agreements shall strive to establish partnerships that
harmonize the Departments' missions under the Act with the Indian tribe's own ecosystem man-
agement objectives." Id. § 6. See also id. § 3(D)(1)-(2). When Indian lands are not involved, but
tribal trust resources or the exercise of tribal rights may be affected, the agencies must facilitate
tribal participation through early notification and consultation with the affected tribes regarding
potential effects of the proposed HCP, and advocate HCP measures "that will restore or enhance
tribal trust resources." Id. § 3(D)(3).
160. See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1084.
161. Id. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Tribal Sovereignty: A New
Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
109, 227-33 [hereinafter A New Trust Paradigm].
162. Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1085. The Order gives tribes greater latitude over "Indian
lands," which do not include fee lands within reservation boundaries, Secretarial Order § 3(D),
than "Indian Country," a more inclusive term, used in many federal statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 1151
and note 2, supra. See, e.g., Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 1 (tribal governments have authority
over the "health and welfare of ecosystems on Indian lands"); princ. 2 ("tribes manage Indian
lands in accordance with tribal goals and objectives"). Another example of differential treatment
is the following excerpt from 3(B):
Departments shall respect the exercise of tribal sovereignty over the man-
agement of Indian lands, and tribal trust resources .... Departments shall con-
duct government-to-government consultation to determine the extent to which
tribal resource management plans for tribal trust resources outside Indian lands
can be incorporated into actions to address the conservation needs of listed
species.
Id. But cf. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(B) (agencies to give deference to tribal conservation
plans for trust lands and tribally owned fee lands). The Appendix, in comparison, takes a broader
approach, by focusing, for the most part, on tribal trust resources, defined as "natural resources,
either on or off Indian lands, retained by, or reserved by or for Indian tribes through treaties,
statutes, judicial decisions, and executive orders, which are protected by a fiduciary obligation on
the part of the United States." Appendix § 3(B). It provides that agencies shall consult with
affected Indian tribes when "considering the designation of critical habitat in an area that may
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spite of these shortcomings, the Order, if fully implemented by the agen-
cies, marks a significant improvement over the status quo of unilateral fed-
eral decisionmaking on wildlife issues in Indian Country.
C. THE ORDER'S EFFECT
At the signing ceremony on June 5, 1997, Secretary Babbitt, drawing
parallels between the day's event and the ceremony's setting, the Treaty
Room in the Old Executive Office Building, proclaimed that the Tribal
Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endangered Species Order is "the
equivalent of a treaty because it was created out of a 'mutuality' between
the United States and 'sovereign tribal governments."' 163 Yet a secretarial
order is a far cry from treaty-based law.
Like nearly all executive-branch orders, the Secretarial Order ex-
pressly states that it does not create any legally enforceable rights or
change existing law. 164 It is not legally binding - neither a tribe nor an
individual member will be able to bring a direct action under the Order if
its provisions are violated. 165 Conversely, treaties do create legally en-
forceable rights.166
In addition, the Order explicitly provides that it "will remain in effect
until amended, superseded, or revoked."'1 67 In other words, although its
provisions were forged by bilateral negotiations with extensive tribal in-
put, 168 the Order can be revoked or amended unilaterally by a subsequent
administration (or, for that matter, the current one, should it so choose).
While treaties may also be unilaterally revoked, such revocation may only
impact tribal trust resources, tribally-owned fee lands, or the exercise of tribal rights. Critical
habitat shall not be designated in such areas unless it is determined essential to conserve a listed
species." Id. § 3(B)(4).
163. Remarks of Secretary Bruce Babbitt, Washington, D.C. (June 5, 1997) (cited in Bilateral-
ism, supra note 97, at 1086).
164. Secretarial Order § 2(B), (C). The Order provides that it "is for guidance within the
Departments only." Id. § 2(A).
165. See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, 911 F. Supp. at 401 (holding that the President's Memoran-
dum on Government-to-Government Consultation is not legally enforceable, and instead is pri-
marily "a political tool for implementing the President's personal Indian affairs policy") (citing In
Re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C.Cir. 1980)). See also Dong v.
Slattery, 84 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that APA does not provide a basis for judicial
enforcement of executive order on political asylum where order does not create a private right of
action); Hoopa Valley Tribe, 812 F.2d at 1103 (holding that BIA memorandum on consultation
with tribes was not legally enforceable, distinguishing Oglala Sioux Tribe, 603 F.2d at 707, on
grounds that BIA in that case had conceded that its guidelines had the force of law).
166. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 424; Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 413.
167. Secretarial Order § 11. It is not uncommon for executive orders to be short-lived, either
by explicit limitation, see, e.g., Hopi Tribe v. Watt, 530 F. Supp. 1217, affd, 719 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.
1983) (citing S.O. 3057, regarding administration of range on Hopi partitioned areas of former
Navajo-Hopi joint use area), or a subsequent change in administration or administrative policy.
168. In comparison, Secretary Babbitt noted that the "traditional treaty process ... has been
one-sided, overbearing and not infrequently unfair." Remarks of Secretary Babbitt, supra note
163. Support for this statement is incontrovertible. See, e.g., Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371. See also
Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows on the Earth" - How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L.
REV. 601, 608-12 (1975); Regis-Civetta, supra note 6, at 311-12.
[Vol. 43
INDIAN LANDS AS CRITICAL HABITAT
be accomplished by Congress. 169
Further, in the hierarchy of legal precedent, administrative orders are
found at the bottom. Orders signed by cabinet-level secretaries are typi-
cally considered to be interpretive rules, which merely clarify existing law
or regulations.17 ° Such rules "are essentially hortatory and instructional in
that they go more to what the administrative officer thinks the statute or
regulation means, when applied in particular, narrowly defined,
situations." '171
On the other hand, although executive policy is not directly enforcea-
ble, an agency's failure to comply with the guidance set forth in a secreta-
rial order may be grounds for invalidation of the agency action as
"arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act. 172
More importantly, courts can look to the provisions of an executive order
for guidance in interpreting the common law trust obligation, and in deter-
mining whether an agency's affirmative trust responsibilities have been
met. 173 At least one court has referred to an executive policy in analyzing
the federal common law trust duty, in spite of the fact that the policy itself
was not enforceable. 174 Thus, an administrative order may provide a mech-
anism for the executive and the judiciary to put flesh on the bare bones of
the trust concept. 175
The Secretarial Order's provisions provide specific guidance for the
courts in reviewing whether the agencies have met their affirmative duty to
fulfill the trust obligation while implementing the ESA. The Order (more
specifically, the Appendix), in spite of its non-binding character, contains
many desirable provisions - both substantive and procedural - which, if
169. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 745.
170. Seldovia Native Association, Inc. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted)). Substantive
rules, by comparison, "'are those which effect a change in existing law or policy.'" Alcaraz, 746
F.2d at 613 (quoting Powderly v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1983)). Efforts to
change existing law through secretarial orders are often met with judicial skepticism. See Arizona
v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 635-37 & nn.25-26 (1983) (Secretary's ex parte resolution of dispute
over reservation boundaries through secretarial order, while boundary issue was pending before
Court in water adjudication, was not final or binding).
171. Alcaraz, 746 F.2d at 613 (quoting Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C.
Cir. 1952)).
172. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983); Seldovia, 904 F.2d at 1345 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446 n.30 (1987) and Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)); Peabody Coal Co. v. Andrus,
477 F. Supp. 120 (D. Wyo. 1979).
173. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 752 (noting that "since the trust obligation is,
fundamentally, one deriving from federal common law, the duties owed to the tribes are present
and enforceable in court whether or not agencies articulate those duties in the form of binding
rules"). See also Oglala Sioux, 603 F.2d at 720-21 (considering BIA's internal guidelines in hold-
ing that the failure to consult with tribe before making decision to reassign an Indian Superinten-
dent violated the BIA's trust responsibility to the tribe).
174. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. Environmental Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465, 1470-
72 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that government's fulfillment of trust responsibility in implementing
generally applicable statute such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act "must be mea-
sured against the 'backdrop' of tribal sovereignty").
175. See COHEN, supra note 14, at 220-28 (trust responsibilities can be defined by, inter alia,
treaties, statutes and executive orders).
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enforced as an expression of the trust responsibility, could go a long way
toward alleviating concerns in the designation of critical habitat.
As for the procedural duty of government-to-government consulta-
tion, the Order provides for early notification and involvement, informa-
tion exchange, deference to tribal management plans and a preference for
cooperative agreements, and it encourages federal assistance to tribes for
development of management plans and agreements. 176 It acknowledges
that tribes are the "appropriate governmental entities" to manage tribal
lands and resources. 177
The Appendix also encourages inter-governmental partnerships, 78 but
falls short of requiring co-management of tribal resources, even those on
tribal lands - FWS and NMFS still hold the trump card in the case of
disputes. 179 Co-management, if embraced by the agencies, could provide
an important tool for effectuating the Order's policy of harmonizing the
trust responsibility with species conservation. Co-management of trust re-
sources has been employed successfully to resolve ongoing disputes be-
tween states and tribes over treaty fishing rights. 8 ° The BIA and federal
176. See Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 1 & 3; Appendix §§ 2(D)-(E), 3. Of course, whether
money for tribal conservation measures will be forthcoming in future federal appropriations re-
mains to be seen. If the track record of the 104th and 105th Congresses on funding of Indian
programs is any indication of future budgets, tribes may be unlikely to see the Secretarial Order's
policies translated into cash. See James Brooke, Cruel Winter on N. Dakota Reservation, ARiz.
REP., Jan. 28, 1997, at Al (midwestern blizzards hit Indians hardest due to dramatic cuts in fed-
eral funds for housing improvements and weatherization); Ada Deer, Proposed 1997 Budget Cuts
Would Devastate Nation's Tribes, FORT APACHE SCOUT, June 21, 1996, at 3 (forecasting shortfalls
in FY 1997 appropriations, and describing effects of FY 1995 and FY 1996 funding cuts); Robert
T. Nelson, Gorton Could Chair Indian Affairs Panel, SEATTLE TIMEs, Nov. 7,1996, at B4 (noting
track record of Senator Gorton, chair of Interior appropriations subcommittee, in cutting funds
from BIA budget); Enric Volante, Indian Tribes Feel Sense of Betrayal, ARIZ. STAR, Dec. 11,
1995, at 1A (proposals to cut a third of the BIA's budget could result in. "termination by appro-
priation instead of by legislation").
177. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(B).
178. Appendix § 6.
179. See id. § 9(A) (providing that disputes be addressed through "government-to-govern-
ment" discourse respectful of tribal policies and agreements).
180. See Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of
the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 375, 406-11 [hereinafter Summer] (discussing Chip-
pewa-Ottawa Treaty Fishing Management Authority in Michigan, and the involvement of inter-
tribal commissions in the Columbia River Fish Management Plan for management of salmon and
steelhead); GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 858 (citing Minn. Stat. § 97.431 (1984)). In re-
sponse to a court order in Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001
(D. Minn. 1971), the state and the tribe entered into a cooperative agreement governing hunting,
fishing and trapping on the reservation, which was ratified by the legislature and incorporated
into a consent judgment. See Minn. Stat. § 97.431 (1984). See also Cooperative Agreement Be-
tween the Grand Portage Band of Chippewa and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (July
16, 1996) [hereinafter Grand Portage Agreement] (agreeing to jointly manage water quality con-
cerns on portion of Lake Superior shoreline which is particularly important to, inter alia, tribal
fisheries). Co-management agreements for fisheries typically include provisions for harvest man-
agement (including gear, seasons and catch limits), tribal-state enforcement, stocking and hatch-
ery programs, and information exchange. See Summer, supra, at 407, 411. See also GETCHES ET
AL., supra note 20, at 859, 881-82 (describing cooperative agreements, including joint manage-
ment plan for Great Lakes fisheries, which provide for cooperative administration of commercial
fishing, recordkeeping, data collection and exchange, and a dispute resolution framework);
Grand Portage Agreement, supra, Section III (providing for information exchange and communi-
cations between tribal and state staff members), Section IV. D (agreeing to consult before taking
enforcement actions), Section V (providing dispute resolution procedures which call upon the U.
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wildlife agencies have, at times, entered into cooperative agreements for
management of natural resource development on Indian lands181 and
broad-ranging fish and wildlife species that traverse Indian lands.18 2 Simi-
larly, in the international arena, it is not at all uncommon for the federal
government to turn to intergovernmental agreements to manage species
which cross jurisdictional lines.1 83
Given the United States' trust responsibility and self-determination
policy, tribal sovereignty and the tribes' intimate knowledge of reservation
resources, 184 co-management agreements with bilateral decision-making
authority are particularly appropriate when federal agencies assert control
over wildlife and its habitat on Indian lands. Such arrangements, either in
the form of cooperative agreements governing discrete issues or memo-
randa of understanding, which are broader in scope, could provide effective
habitat protections consistent with tribal norms and needs, in lieu of critical
habitat designation.185
While the Order's provisions for cooperative agreements do not pro-
vide a specific mandate or "blueprint" for co-management arrangements,
neither do they preclude them. The need for individualized approaches
counsels against a "one size fits all" formulation of provisions, given varia-
tions among tribes' social, legal and economic norms and requirements and
the diverse needs of species, the characteristics of the habitat at issue and
the dynamics of the surrounding ecosystem. In general, however, certain
provisions would likely be important in any setting. For example, agree-
ments should include provisions for dispute resolution, giving appropriate
deference to the tribe; the sharing of monitoring data regarding habitat
condition, species productivity, and ongoing and planned future activities
in the area; and enforcement authority and responsibilities. The Order,
which addresses these issues, albeit in a general fashion, is flexible enough
S. Environmental Protection Agency to assist in resolution of conflicts over water quality
standards).
181. See 25 U.S.C. § 3115 (1994) (encouraging Secretary of Interior, through the BIA, to enter
into cooperative agreements for management of tribal forestry resources).
182. See, e.g., Proposed Establishment of Nonessential Experimental Population of Grey
Wolves in Central Idaho, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,118, 42,123 (1994) (encouraging tribes and states to
enter into cooperative agreements for managing reintroduced wolves); Nez Perce Tribal Wolf
Recovery and Management Plan for Idaho (1995) (copy on file with author) (implementing FWS-
tribal agreement for Nez Perce Tribe to manage federally reintroduced wolves in Idaho). Federal
land management agencies, on the other hand, have resisted giving tribes what they fear is a
"veto" authority over otherwise discretionary activities, particularly where the resource at issue,
for example, fish or game species, occurs on federal public lands. See United States' Memoran-
dum on Motions for Summary Judgment at 24-27 (June 18, 1996) and Reply at 17-22 (July 19,
1996) in Klamath Tribes, 1996 WL 924509 at *3 (arguing that the duty to consult does not include
a right of tribal concurrence or co-management authority, which could result in a form of tribal
veto over management of federal forest lands that support treaty-protected wildlife resources).
183. See Summer, supra note 180, at 410. See generally Symposium on Transboundary
Problems in Natural Resources Law, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. (1983).
184. For further discussion of the role of traditional ecological knowledge and values in wild-
life management, see Section IV.A.2, infra.
185. See Summer, supra note 180, at 411 & n.191; Section IV.A.2, infra.
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to guide partnerships and address relevant management issues in a diverse
array of situations.
With respect to the substantive duty toward both tribal wildlife re-
sources and property interests, the Order evidences an overarching policy
of equitable distribution of environmental burdens. Several of the Order's
provisions could be construed as requiring prioritization of tribal needs,
both for conservation of resources and for utilization of those resources,
over non-tribal interests. In particular, Principle 3(C) provides that tribes
should be given a chance to implement their own conservation measures
where necessary to protect a species, "at the earliest indication that the
need for federal conservation measures is being considered." ' 6 If restric-
tions are still deemed necessary, with respect to activities such as habitat
alterations which could result in incidental take, the conservation standards
are to be followed. 87 Importantly, the Order lists all five conservation
standards - including a requirement that, before the agency may regulate
tribal activities, conservation purposes "cannot be achieved by reasonable
regulation of non-Indian activities. 18 8
In addition, with respect to critical habitat, the Appendix provides that
designations shall not occur on Indian lands unless "determined essential
to conserve a listed species." ''"9 Presumably, the determination of what is
"essential" for conservation remains within the broad discretion of FWS.
This provision, standing alone, leaves too much discretion in agency hands.
However, the federal common law should curtail agency discretion where
Indian lands and resources are involved by providing guidelines through
the trust responsibility, which translates to a higher level of protection and
a means to establish a hierarchy of priorities for Indian interests. 90
Finally, in making the designation decision, the Appendix directs the
agencies to "evaluate and document the extent to which the conservation
needs of the listed species can be achieved by limiting the designation to
other lands."'1 9 This requirement forces the agencies to build a record by
weighing options which might avoid the need for designation on Indian
lands. Affected tribes should be able to shape that record through input
and participation. If the agency's ultimate conclusion goes against the fac-
tual findings in the record, including the evidence submitted by the tribes,
the decision to designate would be found arbitrary and capricious,19 2 and
186. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(C).
187. Id.
188. Id. For a discussion of the standards, see supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
189. Appendix § 3(B)(4).
190. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 745, 747. Professor Wood argued that the trust
obligation to protect tribal resources should result in a higher level of ecological protection than
if solely non-Indian interests were at stake, in part because federal agencies are not empowered
to compromise, ignore or abrogate Indian rights. Id.
191. Appendix § 3(B)(4).
192. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). See Motor Vehicles Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. An agency's
action will be found arbitrary and capricious if:
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an expla-
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perhaps even a violation of the trust responsibility. 193
A designation decision which includes tribal lands might also be found
inconsistent with the language of the ESA itself, which requires FWS to
consider not only the scientific criteria for designation, but also economic
and other relevant impacts.1 94 Further, the ESA provides that identified
areas should be excluded from the final critical habitat designation if the
"benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits of designation" unless exclu-
sion would result in extinction of the species. 195 If the agencies had any
doubt as to the "relevancy" of the trust obligation in implementing the
ESA, the Order makes it abundantly clear that effects on trust resources,
be they economic in nature or otherwise, are relevant, and that such effects
should weigh heavily against designation. The Order, if enforced, effectu-
ates these express statutory provisions in a manner consistent with the trust
responsibility.
Indeed, the Order and Appendix, taken as a whole, are imbued with a
spirit of tribal self-regulation and environmental self-determination, bal-
anced with the government's mandate to conserve species. Together, they
put tribes and listed species on at least an even playing field, and affirma-
tively elevate tribal needs to a higher priority than the development inter-
ests of surrounding, non-Indian landowners and actors.
Although the Order is "no Olympian moment in federal Indian pol-
icy," it is a fair and reasoned approach to a "thorny area" of the law.'96 It
provides more concrete guidance than was previously available to either
the agencies themselves or the courts; in doing so, it curbs free-ranging
agency discretion. Yet it does not strait-jacket agencies or tribes with any
one solution, and allows flexibility to address fact-specific situations, in-
cluding diverse tribal needs and objectives, habitat variations, and the con-
servation needs of species in a particular ecosystem, given past and present
activities both on- and off-reservation. If implemented by the agencies and
enforced by the courts, the Order could be a valuable tool for effectuating
tribal sovereignty and the trust responsibility.
nation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.
Id.
193. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 256.
194. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
195. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). It would seem that, given this express statutory requirement,
critical habitat designations would never occur in Indian Country unless there were concrete
biological evidence that exclusion of Indian lands would result in extinction. This, however, is not
how the statute has been implemented to date. For an analysis and discussion of designations for
the Mexican Spotted Owl, San Juan River fish species and the Southwest Willow Flycatcher, see
infra, Section IV.A.3.
196. Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1088.
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IV. THE ESA'S CRITICAL HABITAT PROVISIONS SHOULD
APPLY TO INDIAN LANDS ONLY AS A MATTER OF
LAST RESORT AND THEN ONLY IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE SECRETARIAL ORDER'S GUIDELINES
A. RESERVATIONS, FIRST AND FOREMOST, ARE CRITICAL HABITAT
FOR INDIAN NATIONS
There are many compelling reasons why tribal interests must be given
the highest priority in the designation of critical habitat. The importance of
the reservation as an island of sovereignty, cultural identity and economic
survival mandates the most careful and exacting consideration of activities
which may affect reservation resources. Additionally, the trust responsibil-
ity to protect tribal resources and sovereignty and the need to restore dis-
tributive justice in environmental and economic affairs both tip the scales
in favor of tribal interests. Finally, traditional ecological knowledge and
values, which play an important role in tribal environmental decision-mak-
ing, must be given primacy when non-Indian objectives are asserted in In-
dian Country.
1. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and the Trust Responsibility
Tribes, as sovereign entities, possess unique political attributes which
private landowners simply do not have.197 Tribal sovereignty includes ex-
pansive control over reservation lands and resources, and extends to the
harvest of wildlife species as well as the utilization of reservation lands,
even lands which provide habitat for listed species.198 In most cases, tribal
sovereignty, along with the federal trust responsibility, justify exclusion of
Indian lands from critical habitat designation.
Development of reservation resources affords tribes with an opportu-
nity - sometimes the only opportunity - to achieve self-sufficiency and to
generate investment capital for future projects, including economic devel-
opment, education, health services and cultural programs. 199 The develop-
ment of natural resources through extractive industries such as coal,
uranium, oil and gas, and silviculture has long been the predominant ave-
nue for economic development on many reservations.200 These are the
very activities most likely to be affected by the designation decision.
Given the importance of tribal lands and resources to the well-being of
197. See, e.g., Morton, 417 U.S. at 555 (holding BIA's hiring preferences for American Indians
do not violate equal protection principles because such preferences are not based on impermissi-
ble racial classifications but on the United States' "unique obligation" toward tribes); Secretarial
Order § 4 (stating "[tihe unique and distinctive political relationship between the United States
and Indian tribes ... differentiates tribes from other entities that deal with, or are affected by, the
federal government").
198. For a discussion, see supra Section I.B.2.
199. For a discussion, see infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
200. See MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BONDS 31-33 (1990); Tsosie, supra note 46,
at 231; Judith Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control
Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L. J. 541, 542-44 (1993).
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tribes with a reservation land base, "environmental self-determination" -
the right to exercise autonomy over tribal lands and resources - no less
than other aspects of self-determination, is critical to tribal sovereignty.20 1
Tribes themselves must balance the need for survival and a decent standard
of living with preservation of Indian lands and wildlife resources in a man-
ner most appropriate to their own norms and values.2 °2 Accordingly, the
federal government, in keeping with its trust responsibility to help preserve
the political, physical and cultural integrity of Indian Nations, should ad-
vance programs and policies which foster environmental self-determination
and avoid interference with tribal priorities, norms and values.
The ESA's provisions for the protection of habitat, viewed through the
lens of tribal self-determination, fail on both counts: critical habitat
designation in Indian Country enforces external, non-tribally driven pre-
rogatives, thereby interfering with tribal sovereignty, and has little relation
to tribal ecological norms and values. In other environmental areas, such
as the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, explicit tribal amendments
strive to resolve potential conflicts between tribal and federal policies by
including Indian tribes within the larger goals of society with specific guide-
lines, funding and delegation of programs to tribes.20 3 In contrast, the ESA
makes no attempt to reconcile the sometimes disparate values reflected in
federal and tribal environmental policies.20 4 For example, the ESA makes
funding available for state programs, but not for tribal initiatives. 0 5 In ad-
dition, the ESA's single-species approach is generally inconsistent with tri-
bal objectives in managing multiple resources and sustainable
ecosystems.2 °6
201. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 227. The term "environmental self-determination" as used in
the present article embraces environmental stewardship, sustainability and utilization of natural
resources.
202. See James L. Huffman, An Exploratory Essay on Native Americans and Environmental-
ism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 916 & n.62 (1992) (noting that environmental protection is argua-
bly a "luxury good" that only the wealthy can support).
203. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 242, 330. Even these statutes sometimes fall short. One com-
mentator noted: "[i]t should come as no surprise that Indian values and belief systems are not
reflected in or accepted by our environmental law," which is incapable of expressing intimate
relationships between the physical, spiritual and social worlds. Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1153.
The converse is true, however - tribal policy is "heavily impacted by the values and norms of
Anglo-American society, embodied in federal environmental law and policy." Tsosie, supra note
46, at 232, 242. All in all, federal environmental law "perpetuates the legacy of European coloni-
alism and racism against American Indian peoples." Telescopes, supra, at 1156.
204. See generally Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq. (1994). Section
10(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e), the only provision of the ESA which references Indian interests, pro-
vides an exemption for Alaska Natives who may take protected species "if such taking is primar-
ily for subsistence purposes" and is accomplished in a non-wasteful manner. Id.
205. See ESA § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1994). It has been noted that: "[t]he lack of Tribal fund-
ing mechanisms under the ESA places a huge financial burden on tribes to manage sensitive
species." Ronnie Lupe, Chairman's Corner: Congress Hears About Our Relationship with the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, FORT APACHE SCOUT, Aug. 4, 1995, at 2 (recounting testimony
given to Senator Kempthorne and other members of the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works) [hereinafter Chairman's Corner].
206. See Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. The White Mountain Apache believe "that man-
aging ecosystems rather than individual listed species is the most practical long-term approach to
preserving biodiversity which is the ultimate intent of the [ESA]," yet the ESA dictates consider-
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Designation of critical habitat is particularly offensive, in that it effec-
tively imposes a federal zoning system on Indian lands by creating a wild-
life "district" zoned for habitat uses, while incompatible uses, such as oil
and gas development, must be undertaken elsewhere. 107 In this way,
designation places federal wildlife priorities over Indian interests. As Jus-
tices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall noted in their dissent in the
Brendale case,
It would be difficult to conceive of a power more central to 'the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,' than the
power to zone .... This fundamental sovereign power of local gov-
ernments to control land use is especially vital to Indians, who enjoy a
unique historical and cultural connection to the land.2 °8
The Justices went on to state that the inability to "engage in the systematic
and coordinated utilization of land" would have a severe impact on tribal
self-governance.20 9 Like the challenge to the Yakama Nation's zoning au-
thority in Brendale, the imposition of critical habitat over portions of the
reservation results in patch-work administration of the land base and effec-
tively defeats comprehensive tribal planning. Moreover, designation signif-
icantly limits tribal sovereignty by preventing the use of Indian lands in a
manner consistent with traditional ecological knowledge, economic goals
and tribal ethics.210
It would be a mistake, however, to consider tribes' interests in re-
source utilization without also considering their interests in preservation.
It is plausible, at least at first blush, that critical habitat designations, which
have as their goal the protection of listed species, advance the interests of
Indian Nations in the preservation of their land and resources from envi-
ronmental degradation. Along these lines, Professor Mary Wood argues
that the trust responsibility should require federal agencies, particularly the
BIA, to safeguard tribes from the adverse effects of development activi-
ation of one species at a time. Id. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B). Tribes are not alone in the
belief that ecosystem management is preferable than the single species approach. See Holly
Doremus, Comment, Patching the Ark; Empowering Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18
ECOLOGY L. Q. 265 (1991) (proposing an extension of Endangered Species Act protections to
embrace ecosystem management concepts); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Con-
structing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293 (1994) (arguing that a fed-
eral ecosystem mandate be adopted); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-
Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely
Different? 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555 (1995) [hereinafter Biodiversity] (stating that ecosystem-
based partnerships between federal, state, and private agencies are desirable for private lands
conservation). See also Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Manage-
ment, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 975-76 (1997) (discussing uncertainties of ecosystem approach, and
concluding that it remains necessary to protect individual species as provided in the ESA).
207. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRAC-
TICES 653-54 (2d ed. 1997). Critical habitat is akin to a traditional zoning, or land use, regulation,
in that it divides land into areas in accordance with uses deemed acceptable and consistent with
the public or community good, thereby inhibiting the private landowner's use and enjoyment of
property. See id.
208. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 458 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
209. Id.
210. For specific examples where critical habitat designation has disproportionately burdened
Indian lands, see infra Section IV.A.3.
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ties,21' and even to deny lease transactions approved by the tribal council if
they are not in the "best interest" of the tribe. 2
The concerns presented by natural resources development on Indian
lands should in no way be minimized. The protection of wildlife and its
habitat is at least as important in Indian Country as it is elsewhere. As
resources on state, federal and private lands become more and more de-
pleted, Indian Country is seen as prime property for some of the most in-
tensive uses of natural resources, including strip-mining, timber harvest,
grazing, and solid and hazardous waste disposal. Indian lands, "[p]ushed to
the perimeter of 'civilization' during the years of westward expansion, are
now often perceived as fields of opportunity for a nation faced with the
dismal legacy of overdevelopment. 2 13 There are many distressing exam-
ples of adverse environmental effects resulting from extractive industries,
particularly those perpetrated by non-Indian mining interests. 214 Nonethe-
less, a standard which would allow BIA to disapprove tribal initiatives uni-
laterally would severely undermine tribal sovereignty and self-
determination.2 15 Tribes considering development opportunities that result
in alteration of the natural environment face a difficult choice, yet it is
plainly a choice which they are entitled to make for themselves.
Moreover, any temptation to believe that Indian tribes should engage
211. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1480-89.
212. Id. at 1480, 1550-51. The best interest standard finds its source in numerous tribal re-
source statutes, including the timber management and mineral leasing statutes. See, e.g., 25
U.S.C. §§ 406-407 (1994) (timber management), §§ 399, 2102 (mineral royalties and leasing),
§§ 331, 382 (irrigation projects). Professor Wood indicated that tribal dissension might serve as a
harbinger for BIA disapproval of tribal council decisions. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at
1486-88 & n.77, 1551-64. Certainly, tribes, like most societal groups, do not always present a
unified front. Disparate views within a tribe, some of which advocate traditional "Indian ways"
and others who would more readily seize modern-day development opportunities, make it diffi-
cult to craft any legal standard to guide the "best interest" inquiry. Proposals for nuclear waste
storage facilities have perhaps generated the most publicized examples of intra-tribal conflict.
See, e.g., David Rich Lewis, Native Americans and the Environment: A Survey of Twentieth-Cen-
tury Issues, 19 AM. INDIAN Q. 423, 1995 WL 14787562 (June 1, 1995) (describing interest of some
tribal leaders, including the Mescalero Apache council president, in monitored retrievable stor-
age facilities for nuclear waste from commercial reactors, and opposition by tribal members);
Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1486 n.75 (describing opposition and protests). Uranium mining
has also been a subject of internal controversy. See Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir.
1977) (members challenged EIS for mining agreement between tribal government and Exxon).
For examples of tribal discord on natural resource development issues in general, see Indian
Land, supra note 28, at 1486-87 and nn. 73-76. While in no way discounting the difficulties posed
by intra-tribal disagreement on environmental issues, the bottom line here is, again, dictated by
principles of self-determination - tribes themselves are the appropriate entities to sort out these
thorny issues pursuant to their own objectives and values; no one else, BIA included, should
purport to act as arbiter.
213. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 225. Professor Tsosie provided a detailed and thoughtful discus-
sion of the challenges facing Indian Nations today in the face of competing demands for eco-
nomic development and preservation of important natural resources. She noted that competing
views within tribes themselves, pitting economic against preservationist interests, "appear mutu-
ally exclusive" yet, "American Indian nations, like all societies, must try to do both": preserve
the past while ensuring future economic development. Id. at 226.
214. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1481-86; AMBLER, supra note 200, at 174-92.
215. See Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1551 (acknowledging that "[a]ny judicial invalidation
of a transaction initially approved by a tribal government naturally strikes many as an invasion
into tribal prerogative").
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only in traditional, non-extractive activities, and to presume that non-tradi-
tional development which could result in environmental degradation is not
in the tribes' best interests, must be firmly rejected.216 Although some
tribes have maintained traditional land-based economies,217 traditional ac-
tivities may not be lucrative or even available to many tribes, due to forced
removal from familiar homelands and limited opportunities for economic
survival in the desolate, arid areas where most reservations are situated.218
The ESA, overlaid with principles of tribal sovereignty, must allow some
level of environmental impact on Indian lands, particularly that which re-
sults from Indian-owned or controlled activities - be they traditional or
non-traditional - as an inevitable consequence of utilization of reservation
resources.
219
Perhaps more to the point, the prohibitions flowing from critical
habitat designation are more likely to be detrimental to tribal interests than
to comport with a standard which reflects the best interests of tribes. In
fact, designation can be adverse both to the very conservation duty it pur-
ports to advance and to tribal environmental self-determination. Critical
habitat, based on the needs of a single species rather than the needs of an
216. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 326. The selection of a "nontraditional means of economic
development does not mean that the tribe has abandoned all of its traditional norms"; instead, it
may simply represent a choice to ensure "survival . . . and a decent standard of living." Id.
Professor Tsosie noted: "It would be unfair to expect Indian people to always choose [traditional
norms of the relationship of humans to the environment] over [norms ensuring the survival of the
people and a decent standard of living], particularly in light of the severe poverty and deprivation
that plague many reservations today." Id. at 324-25. Indian development of coal and timber
resources and use of modern fishing and agricultural methods is not contradictory with their
reputation as "stewards of the earth. Indian cultures have survived because they do use the
earth's resources, but with a sensitive touch." David H. Getches, A Philosophy of Permanence, J.
OF THE WEST 54-68 (1990) (emphasis added). See Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1153-54. Profes-
sor Williams noted: "Whether land should be used or developed in a certain way depends on the
peoples' needs." Id. If, for example, a landfill or waste dump "can be located in an area which is
not being utilized by the tribe, then that option will be considered, along with its impact down to
the seventh generation of the tribe yet to come." Conversely, "[i]f the hazardous waste dump is
going to be put in a place where important spiritual, social, or physical values of the tribe are
implicated, then the tribe doesn't even think about it. It's just not done. There is an attitude of
deep and abiding respect for the land and the resources it yields." Id.
217. See LaDuke, supra note 48, at 140-42 (describing examples of successful tribal efforts to
employ traditional practices, such as wild rice gathering, fishing, forestry and sustainable dry-
farming practices, both for domestic uses and production for exchange or export). See also Coali-
tion of Tribes Hopes to Take Lead in Bison Industry, CHAR-KoOSTA NEWS, Jan. 31, 1997, at 1
(reporting that Intertribal Bison Cooperative, with 39 member tribes, was awarded a First Na-
tions Development Institute grant to manage bison herds for cultural and business purposes,
including the sale of meat, tannery operations, artwork and tourism).
218. See Royster, supra note 200, at 544. For tribes whose reservations are situated in remote
territory with high rates of unemployment, "the mineral estate represents the best, if not the only,
hope for economic development." Id. See generally Frank Pommersheim, Economic Develop-
ment in Indian Country: What are the Questions?, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 195 (1987) [hereinafter
Economic Development]. Moreover, arid landholdings in the West are likely to remain so with-
out the development of water resource projects, such as dams and diversion works. However,
because Indian development has lagged behind that of other western interests, many tribes will
likely be unable to enjoy the benefits of their water rights, leaving them with even fewer options
for economic survival. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 1326-29.
219. See Mark Allen, Native American Control of Tribal Natural Resource Development in the
Context of the Federal Trust and Tribal Self-Determination, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 857
(1989) (discussing the need for tribal control of natural resources development).
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ecosystem or community of interacting resources, 221 is not necessarily envi-
ronmentally beneficial, and can prevent management measures necessary
for the conservation of other wildlife species and natural resources. 2
Meanwhile, designation can delay or even prevent development of eco-
nomic resources.
Finally, while environmentalists and neighboring landowners222 criti-
cize tribes for accepting development proposals that pose potential danger
to the environment,223 the true effects of carefully planned development
may have little to do with environmental impacts. The major issues faced
by tribes planning development activities may instead be ill-begotten ste-
reotypes, paternalism, and even outright racism.224 The "noble savage"
ideal, foisted on tribes by 19th and early 20th century novelists and philoso-
phers, notably, James Fenimore Cooper and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and
some modern day environmental interest groups, would have Indians reject
economic development altogether if it did not comport with traditional life-
ways "in harmony with nature. ' 225 Dean Huffman paints a powerful pic-
ture of the likely result of such beliefs: "While white Americans pursue
harmony with mother nature from their comfortable offices ... and high
tech kayaks . . ., Native Americans will struggle to feed their children and
make sense of a culture not of nature but of alcohol, poverty and despera-
tion. '2 26 Clearly, any formulation of a standard for reviewing development
220. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B) (1994) (the designation
decision is to be based on the physical and biological features essential to the individual listed
species). Although the ESA's statement of policy does provide that ecosystems should be con-
served, the substantive, enforceable provisions of the Act are directed at the needs of individual
species. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (general policy) with §§ 1533(b)(1)(B) (designation crite-
ria), 1540 (penalties provision) and 1540(g) (citizen suits).
221. See Catron County, 75 F.2d at 1436; Fund for Animals, 903 F. Supp. at 96. For a discus-
sion of the ineffectiveness of critical habitat as a conservation tool see Section II.C.1, infra. For a
comparison of more holistic management approaches taken by various tribes see Section IV.B.
infra.
222. The "Not in My Backyard" ("NIMBY") syndrome is a well-documented phenomenon.
See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 373
(1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
223. It is also true that environmentalists, who are sometimes the most vocal opponents of
tribal development proposals, have supported tribal efforts to stop environmentally destructive
development on or near Indian lands, though their objectives are often quite different than those
of the tribe. See, e.g., Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1161 (noting that environmental members of
the Apache Survival Coalition were cynical about the sacred nature of Mt. Graham but joined
forces with the tribe simply to stop construction of multiple telescopes on its peaks).
224. See Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribes
approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 933, 941-42 (1992) (discussing the Campo Band's proposal to lease tribal lands to a solid
waste management firm for the siting of a landfill).
225. See FERGUS BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 34-35, 48 (1996). See also
Huffman, supra note 202, at 909-10; Tsosie, supra note 46, at 323 (non-Indians, having decimated
their own natural resources, have proposed that tribes opt for "eco-tourism" as an appropriate
means of economic stability, to ensure that Indian lands remain pristine); Gover & Walker, supra
note 224, at 942 ("[T]he 'noble savage' stereotype that leads one to believe that 'real Indians'...
would never harm their environment ... smacks of the same arrogance that led fifteenth-century
Europeans to conclude that they had 'discovered' America."); Lewis, supra note 212, at 423, 1995
WL 14787562, *16-18 (stereotyping Indians as "the original conservationists" denies their "hu-
manity, culture, history, and most importantly, their modernity").
226. Huffman, supra note 202, at 903.
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proposals on Indian lands must eradicate the vestiges of colonialism and
respect tribal sovereignty and self-determination.227
2. Traditional Ecological Values Play the Preeminent Role in Preserving
the Reservation as a Homeland
Reservation lands - the most important trust resource for many
tribes228 - can rightfully be characterized as critical habitat for the Ameri-
can Indian tribes themselves,229 who at one point in our country's history
were fully expected to go extinct. 3 ° The reservation today marks "the en-
during survival of Indian communities from a marauding western society,"
as well as the fulfillment of individual and tribal vitality. 31 Professor Frank
Pommersheim describes the reservation as a "place" essential to an individ-
ual's well-being and sense of belonging, and to tribal sovereignty and self-
determination:23 2 "The reservation is home. It is a place where the land
lives and stalks people, where the land looks after people and makes them
live right, a place where the earth's ways provide solace and nurture.,
233
227. See A New Trust Paradigm, supra note 161, at 128-32 (providing standards for determin-
ing whether development activities are consistent with tribal interests). In keeping with an over-
riding objective of preserving sovereignty and resisting assimilation, Professor Wood proposed
that the "focal points for trust analysis" of federal actions which affect Indian resources should be
"(1) a stable land base; (2) a functioning economy; (3) the ability to govern; and (4) cultural and
religious vitality." Id. The Secretarial Order on Tribal Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endan-
gered Species, which provides for government-to-government consultations, cooperative manage-
ment and prioritization of Indian interests, while conserving imperiled species in Indian Country
and beyond, both advances Indian sovereignty and counters assimilative forces. Its provisions, if
implemented by the agencies and enforced by the courts, would provide a vehicle for meeting
Wood's four-pronged approach for fulfilling the trust responsibility toward tribal land and re-
sources, at least in the context of ESA enforcement. For a discussion of the Order, see Section
III(B)-(C), supra.
228. For a discussion of the reservation resource, see Section I(B)(2), supra.
229. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 1331. Hansen noted: "The lack of economic activity has
left many western Indian reservations poor but picturesque enclaves of critical habitat." Id.
230. See Stanley M. Pollack, Native Fishes vs. Native Americans: Endangered Species in Con-
flict, GREENFIRE REP. 3-4 (1992) (asserting that American Indians are themselves "endangered
species"; thus, the ESA calls for a different approach when tribal interests are implicated); Miller,
supra note 115, at 578-79 (abrogation of treaty fishing rights through the application of ESA
restrictions would result in severe impacts to tribal culture, religion and welfare, and could be
considered genocide under international treaties). See also Michael L. Chiropolos, Inupiat Sub-
sistence and the Bowhead Whale: Can Indigenous Hunting Cultures Coexist with Endangered
Animal Species?, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL L & POL'Y 213, 234 (1994) (noting that threats to
Inupiat subsistence caused by oil exploration "illustrate[ ] the inherent precariousness of any situ-
ation when endangered cultures are dependent upon endangered species"). The "Vanishing Red
Man" theory - that American Indians were racially inferior and therefore doomed to extinction
- is thought to have provided the United States with justification for relocating tribes from their
homelands. See James Riding In, Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of Imperial
Archeology and American Indians, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11, 22 (1992); Jack F. Trope & Walter R.
Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Leg-
islative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992).
231. Place, supra note 18, at 246. Tribal land provides "a physical, human, legal, and spiritual
reality that embodies the history, the dreams and the aspirations of Indian people, their commu-
nities, and their tribes." Id.
232. Id. at 250-51. See also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 7-8, 11-15 (1995)
[hereinafter BRAID OF FEATHERS]. For a discussion of the role and language of "place" in West-
ern Apache culture, see KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM SITS IN PLACES (1996).
233. Place, supra note 18, at 251 (citations omitted). Professor Pommersheim noted: "Land is
inherent to Indian people; they often cannot conceive of life without it. They are part of it and it
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Reservations, once viewed as desolate waste-lands,234 today serve at
least three essential, interrelated purposes: cultural identity, political sov-
ereignty, and the potential for economic well-being.235 The tribes' political
authority over their reservation lands and resources has helped Indian Na-
tions keep their cultures intact.2 36 The economic potential of reservations
is also critical to the continued viability of tribes as cultural and political
communities.237  Further, unlike the majority Anglo-American culture,
given the unique nature of tribal culture and land tenure systems, tribes
cannot simply relocate to new areas when they are precluded from utilizing
and enjoying reservation lands and resources for any reason, whether it be
environmental degradation or the development constraints imposed by the
ESA.238
Reservation lands can most readily maintain their value and character
as critical habitat for Indian Nations if tribal environmental priorities,
which flow from tribal knowledge and ecological values, play the preemi-
nent role in preserving and utilizing reservation resources. Policies flowing
from the environmental knowledge possessed by indigenous peoples 239 are
is part of them; it is their Mother." Id. at 250. See also N. Scott Momaday, A First American
Views His Land, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, July 1976, at 14 [hereinafter First American] ("The earth is
our mother. The sky is our father."). Perhaps the most famous expression of an American In-
dian's stewardship ethic and reverence for the land is attributed to Chief Seal'th (anglicized as
"Seattle"), of the Duwamish: "Every part of this soil is sacred in the estimation of my people...
its verdant valleys, its murmuring rivers, its magnificent mountains, sequestered vales and ver-
dant-lined lakes and bays ...... INDIAN ORATORY: FAMOUS SPEECHES BY NOTED INDIAN
CHIEFrAINS 120-21 (W.C. Vanderworth ed. 1971) (cited in ECOCIDE OF NATIVE AMERICA 24
(Donald Grinde and Bruce Johansen eds. 1995) (noting that the exact translation of Seal'th's
environmental message has been disputed).
234. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 22. Indian reservations are some of the most impov-
erished areas in the nation. Id. See BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra note 232, at 11 & n.1; Huffman,
supra note 202, at 909-10. Four of the eight poorest counties in the United States are located on
Indian reservations in South Dakota: Shannon County, on the Pine Ridge Reservation; Buffalo
County, on the Crow Creek Reservation; Ziebach County, on the Cheyenne River Reservation;
and Todd County, on the Rosebud Reservation, rank first, second, fifth and eighth poorest, re-
spectively. BRAID OF FEATHERS, supra, at 11 n.1 & 162 n.1 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979 County per Capita Income Figures Released by Census
Bureau from the 1980 Census (1983)). According to the 1990 census, more than 30% of Ameri-
can Indians, including those who live both on- and off-reservation, live below the poverty level.
GETCHES ET AL., supra, at 16.
235. AMBLER, supra note 200, at 1-2, 6-8.
236. Id. at 8. See also Place, supra note 18, at 268 (quoting Gerald Clifford, Oglala Sioux:
"[O]ur relationship to one another as Lakota are defined by our relationship to the earth[.] Until
we get back on track in our relationship to the earth, we cannot straighten out any of our rela-
tionships to ourselves, to other people.").
237. See Place, supra note 18, at 269. The history of removal, allotment and assimilation, and
termination nearly severed the bonds to the land and "eradicat[ed] ... an economic relation to it
as a material provider of sustenance." Id. The economic role of the land, no less than its spiritual
and healing roles, "must be resuscitated." Id.
238. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 745. Wood noted that: "The transcience and mo-
bility that provide short-term solutions to members of the majority society do not provide options
to tribes when their way of life is threatened." Id.
239. The term "indigenous people" is typically used in reference to "'original inhabitants of
traditional lands' who maintain their traditional values, culture, and way of life." Tsosie, supra
note 46, at 272 (citing Simon Brascoupe, Indigenous Perspectives on International Development,
AKWE:KON J., Summer 1992, at 6, 8).
19981
SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
far superior to centralized "cookie-cutter" federal policies.2 4' An intimate
relationship with the land and its inhabitants has, in many cases, given rise
to sustainable ecological values,2 41 comprised of both a land ethic2 42 and
scientific knowledge resulting from generations of environmental
interaction.2 43
Professor Tsosie, building on the work of numerous scholars, including
Ronald Trosper, described an indigenous ecological value system based on
holistic concepts of relationships, respect and connectivity between humans
and the natural world.244 There are four fundamental aspects of this sys-
240. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 273, 312. For detailed discussions of indigenous ecological
knowledge, see id.; VINE DELORIA, JR., RED EARTH, WHITE LIES: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE
MYTH OF SCIENTIFIC FACT, 47-50, 232-33 (1997); LaDuke, supra note 48, at 127; First American,
supra note 233, at 17-18. For compendia of vignettes and essays reflecting the environmental
expertise of indigenous peoples internationally, see TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Robert E. Johannes ed. 1989) and DAVID SUZUKI & PETER KNUDTSON,
WISDOM OF THE ELDERS: SACRED NATIVE STORIES OF NATURE (1992).
241. There is always a danger of making categorical statements about the attributes of groups
as diverse as American Indian tribes, who have wide-ranging experiences and unique identities.
For the purposes of this article, however, I do make some general assumptions about indigenous
ecological knowledge and environmental ethics, based on the work of numerous scholars who
have drawn useful parallels among indigenous peoples, including American Indians, and their
environmental beliefs and practices. See, e.g., SUZUKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 241, at xxxv, 16-
18; Christopher Vescey, American Indian Environmental Religions, in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVI-
RONMENTS: ECOLOGICAL ISSUES IN NATIVE AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Christopher Vescey & Rob-
ert Venables eds. 1980) [hereinafter American Indian Environments]; Randy Kapashesit &
Murray Klippenstein, Aboriginal Group Rights and Environmental Protection, 36 MCGILL L.J.
925, 929-32 (1991); LaDuke, supra note 48, at 127, 147-78; First American, supra note 233, at 14,
17-18; Ronald Trosper, Traditional American Indian Economic Policy, 19 AMER. INDIAN CUL-
TURE AND RES. J. 65, 67-69 (1995). See also LINDA CLARKSON ET AL., OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO
THE SEVENTH GENERATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 4-5, 65
(1992) (finding "respect for the earth and all creation" fundamental to indigenous societies every-
where); Tsosie, supra note 46, at 271-87 (concluding that similarities may stem from fact that
American Indian cultures had "land-based" rather than "market-based" economies, and had sim-
ilar experiences with European contact, and accepting Trosper's model of indigenous environ-
mental values); Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1074 (noting that in developing a position with
regard to the implementation or revision of the ESA, tribes agreed that efforts should "build
upon principles of holistic management, sustained utilization of resources, spirituality and con-
tinuity of unique cultures and beliefs, and stewardship"). Cf. Place, supra note 18, at 269 (noting
the land "evokes the fundamental Lakota aspirations to live in harmony with Mother Earth and
to embody the traditional virtues of wisdom, courage, generosity, and fortitude").
242. See ALDO LEOPALD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 224-25 (1949).
243. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 273 & nn. 267-68. Many American Indians have a reverence
for the land and a unique "perception that is acquired only in the course of many generations."
First American, supra note 229, at 17 (Momaday illustrated this point with Kiowa and Jemez
Pueblo experiences). Professor Tsosie concluded that Western science, which had "long been
dismissive" toward indigenous ecological knowledge, "is beginning to change as scientists are
beginning to realize that indigenous peoples have developed systems to understand and work
with their environments that are often vastly more complex than those understood by Western
scientists," for example, knowledge of the healing properties of certain plants, and that music can
assist the growth of plants, id. at n.262. See generally DELORIA, supra note 240, at 44-45; LaDuke,
supra note 48, at 127; SUZUKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 240, at xxvii-xliv, 11-22. The ecological
knowledge of First Peoples is not a "romantic idea[ ] of an extinct past that ha[s] no relevance to
modem urban dwellers. [It] endure[s] and holds the key to our sanity and survival." Id. at xxxiv
(emphasis supplied). Modern science alone "is not enough to solve the planetary crisis"; humility
and reverence for life is crucial. SUZUKI & KNUDTSON at xxx-xxxi.
244. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 276-87 (providing a detailed examination of these values in an
effort to understand tribal environmental decision-making). See also Trosper, supra note 241, at
67-69; Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1135 & n.3, 1153 (discussing concepts of harmony and
humility, common to the Navajo, Apache and other tribes, and noting that "Indians have many
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tem: (1) a perception of the earth as an animate being; (2) an understand-
ing of human kinship with other living beings; (3) a belief that reciprocity
and balance extend to present and future generations of humans, and be-
tween humans and the natural world; and (4) a concept of "belonging" to
the land.245
These traditional ecological values lend themselves to sustainable re-
source use, 246 a common objective in most federal natural resource stat-
utes, including the ESA,247 and a cornerstone of the more recent
international declarations.248 Indeed, many indigenous peoples advocate a
concept of sustainability to ensure the survival of the land and its resources,
and the people who rely on them, for seven generations.249 Even if the
concept of sustainability were not expressly voiced, "[flor Indian peoples,
who traditionally interpreted their relationship with the land and with fu-
ture generations as holistic, cyclical, and permanent, sustainability [is] the
natural result, if not the conscious goal, of deeply rooted environmental
ethics and traditional land-based economies. "250
There is persuasive evidence that tribes, guided by traditional ecologi-
ways to imagine and act upon this intimate relation between the spiritual, physical, and social
worlds, but all of them basically boil down to a deep and abiding reverence for the land that
sustains the interconnected worlds of the tribe").
245. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 276 n.286. These four tenants "are fluid and overlap to a great
extent." Id.
246. Sustainability is defined in international instruments as development that "meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs." UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR
COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE]. The concept entails a "rate of
consumption the will ensure a constant supply of resources." Tsosie, supra note 46, at 286. See
OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra, at 43-49. Similarly, federal statutes define "sustained yield" as
"the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output
of... renewable resources... without impairment of the productivity of the land." Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 531(b) (1994). See Federal Lands Policy and Management Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1702(h) (1994).
247. See National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600(3), 1604(e) (1994); Multiple-
Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1994); Federal Lands Policy and Management Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1994). See also 25 U.S.C. §§ 466, 3104(b) (1994) (Secretary of Interior must
manage Indian forest lands in accordance with the sustained yield principle); 25 C.F.R. § 166.2 -.3
(1997) (sustained yield objective applies to grazing leases on Indian lands). The ESA advances
sustainability through its conservation objective, see Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(b) (1994), but, in contrast to the other statutes, prioritizes a single resource or species in a
largely non-holistic regime. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B).
248. The 1992 Declaration on Environment and Development ("Rio Declaration"), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 151/PCIWG.III/Rev.1 (April 2, 1992), explicitly embraces sustainable resource
development as a primary objective. See also princ. 1, 3-5. In comparison, the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
48/14/Rev.1 (1972), does not refer to "sustainability" per se, but includes related goals and objec-
tives in many of its provisions. See also princ. 2 (safeguard natural resources for present and
future generations); princ. 5 (use nonrenewable resources in a manner which guards against fu-
ture exhaustion); princ. 13 (development should be compatible with environmental protection
and improvement).
249. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 288; CLARKSON ET AL., supra note 241, at 14-15, 58-59, 63-
65.
250. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 287-88. The American Indian philosophy of permanence "com-
mits the people to a permanent existence in harmony with everything around them ... [and]
explains the[ir] success ... in surviving in America for thousands of years." Getches, supra note
216, at 54-68, in GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 20, at 33. This philosophy lends itself to use of the
earth's resources "with a sensitive touch." Id. at 34.
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cal values, have been able to do a better job at managing their natural
resources than did the BIA.25 Several tribes have adopted innovative tim-
ber programs, which reduce annual harvest from former BIA-established
quantities and restrict the use of clearcutting as a harvest method.252 The
White Mountain Apache, for example, guided by a tradition of steward-
ship, have cut timber harvest on their reservation nearly in half from BIA
levels.253 Tribes have also adopted progressive wildlife codes governing
hunting and fishing on Indian lands, 254 sustainable, community-based agri-
cultural methods adapted to the unique reservation environment,255 and
stringent water quality standards to protect fisheries and tribal use.256
Thus, tribal environmental priorities and values provide the most ap-
propriate vehicle for effectuating cultural identity, political sovereignty and
economic well-being through the use and preservation of reservation
lands. ESA enforcement in Indian Country, particularly with respect to
critical habitat designations, must be consistent with tribal values and pri-
orities, with tribes as full partners in the decision-making process.
3. Distributive Justice
The inequities inherent in forcing tribes to bear a disproportionate
251. See Getches, supra note 216, at 34; Tsosie, supra note 46, at 231; Bilateralism, supra note
97, at 1070. See also GETCHES ET AL., supra note 20, at 652 (citing Angelo A. Iadarola, Indian
Timber: Federal or Self-Management? (1979) (BIA management of tribal forests has ranged
from "mediocre to abysmal"); Gover & Walker, supra note 200, at 939 (describing the tribal
waste code adopted by the Campo Band of Mission Indians as equally or more stringent than
applicable federal laws - "the most stringent and aggressive environmental program in Califor-
nia"); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA's approval
of stringent water quality standards established by the Pueblo of Isleta, which would require
expensive upgrades to the City's wastewater treatment plant upstream). Cf. AMBLER, supra note
200, at 261 (the consistently recurring federal policy of treating Indian lands and resources like
federal public lands and resources "has resulted in persistent inequities toward and exploitation
of Indians").
252. See, e.g., Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5, 54-56 (noting that the tribal resource
management plan utilizes uneven aged management and prevents harvest on steep slopes);
Tsosie, supra note 46, at 296 (noting sustainable, traditional forestry practices adopted by Me-
nominee Tribe of Wisconsin); Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1070-71 (discussing examples of tim-
ber programs, which, inter alia, reduce annual harvest and/or restrict clearcutting, adopted by the
White Mountain Apache Tribe, the Yakama Nation and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe).
253. See Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. The White Mountain Apache Tribal Council has
reduced allowable timber harvest from 92 million board feet to 57 million board feet, and can-
celed several old growth timber sales due to cultural and environmental concerns. Id. The Chair-
man observed that: "We are now in the process of repairing the extensive damages that were
done to our grazing lands, forests and riparian areas." Id.
254. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 325 (1983) (holding that the State may not su-
perimpose its hunting and fishing requirements on non-members on reservation where Apache
had adopted comprehensive fish and game code; exercise of concurrent jurisdiction would disrupt
the tribal regulatory scheme and impede Congress' objective of encouraging self-governance).
See Bilateralism, supra note 97, at 1070. See also notes 308-310 and accompanying text, infra, for
a dicussion of the effectiveness of tribal conservation measures for protection of wildlife and
fisheries. The majority of tribes have their own natural resources agencies, and, while many are
chronically under funded, most have well-trained, highly motivated staff.
255. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 295-96 (discussing Zuni project which implements tradi-
tional methods suitable for arid desert environment).
256. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque, 97 F.3d at 427; Montana v. United States EPA, 941 F.
Supp. 945 (D. Mont. 1996), affd, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding EPA regulations treat-
ing tribes as states for purposes of promulgating water quality standards).
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conservation burden provide a final reason that designations should not
include Indian lands except as a last resort. In many, if not most, cases, fish
and wildlife species have been brought to the brink of extinction by non-
Indian development activities. Indian Nations, whose reservation lands are
now enclaves of suitable habitat, should not be forced to forego economic
opportunities to compensate for the effects of past development and
habitat degradation.
The concept of distributive justice, at base, promotes "the equal distri-
bution of wealth and resources throughout society." '57 The principles of
distributive justice as applied to environmental law dictate that the burdens
of conservation are borne by those who benefitted from activities which
drove species toward extinction and degraded their habitat.z58
There are many compelling examples of distributive and environmen-
tal injustice in Indian Country.25 9 The experiences of the White Mountain
Apache are informative. The reservation, which includes five ecosystem
zones ranging from arid desert to sub-alpine forest, is home to many sensi-
tive and listed wildlife species. According to Chairman Lupe's testimony
before a Senate Committee,
The species found on our reservation that are listed as 'endan-
gered' are rare because there are few healthy habitats elsewhere ....
Those who sought to impose the ESA upon our Tribe and our aborig-
inal lands[ ]... had long ago exterminated native animals and plants
257. Tsosie, supra note 46, at 241 n.82 (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 120-21 (1988)).
258. Distributive justice became front page news recently during negotiations leading toward
an international global warming treaty. See Karen Breslaw, Running on Fumes, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
8, 1997, at 31; Martha M. Hamilton & Clay Chandler, Global Warming's Tough Economic Trade-
Offs, WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY EDITION, Dec. 1, 1997, at 8; Nicholas D. Kristof, Asian Pollu-
tion is Widening its Deadly Reach, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 29, 1997, at Al. See also Clinton Plan
Would Return to 1990 Levels, Require Developing Country Role, 28 ENV'T RPTR. (BNA) 1237-39
(Oct. 24, 1997) (United States would not adopt plan to combat global warming without participa-
tion of developing countries). One of the most hotly contested issues is the extent to which
developing countries will be made to bear the burden of environmental degradation and ozone
depletion caused, in large part, by industrialized countries' resource development, and in particu-
lar their use of fossil fuels for energy and economic growth. See Hamilton & Chandler, supra, at
8-9. This is not an isolated phenomenon, either internationally or domestically - the "inability
to promote the common interest in sustainable development is often a product of the relative
neglect of economic and social justice within and amongst nations." OUR COMMON FUTURE,
supra note 246, at 49.
259. The term "environmental justice" is frequently used in reference to the movement to
remedy past inequities in the siting of multiple sources of contaminants near minority and disad-
vantaged communities and in the enforcement of environmental violations. See Executive Order
No. 12,898 on Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low Income Population, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). While these issues do affect Indian tribes,
tribal concerns are unique, in large part because of their sovereign status. See Dean Suagee,
Turtle's War Party: An Indian Allegory on Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LING. 461
(1994). See also Summer, supra note 180, at 377 (noting that "The most cherished civil rights of
Indian people are not based on equality of treatment under the Constitution and the general civil
rights laws.... Indian rights derive from different sources..." including treaties, statutes, execu-
tive orders and the "special trust relationship with the United States"). In addition, tribal envi-
ronmental interests are unique in that environmentally important sites may also be sacred sites to
some tribes. See Telescopes, supra note 54, at 1152 (discussing Apache's opposition to construc-
tion of telescopes on Mt. Graham). In this article, the term "environmental injustice" is used to
describe the inequitable allocation of conservation burdens.
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and had erected cities of concrete and steel where prairies, wetlands,
and other wildlife habitat once existed.26°
Not too surprisingly, given the rural and relatively undeveloped condi-
tion of the White Mountain Apache reservation vis-a-vis surrounding ar-
eas, critical habitat for a variety of listed species, including the Mexican
Spotted Owl, loach minnow and razorback sucker, was proposed to include
reservation lands.261 Chairman Lupe predicted that the designations would
undermine the goals of tribal governance, self-determination and economic
self-sufficiency by paralyzing the tribe's resource development activities, in-
cluding its sawmill, cattle industry, ski area and other recreational facilities,
and, indeed, by undermining "our entire wildlife and land-management
philosophy. '262 The FWS ultimately excluded the White Mountain and Ji-
carilla Apache Reservations from the Mexican Spotted Owl designation
because the Tribes adopted conservation plans or agreements which re-
moved threats to the species.2 63
The effects of the final Mexican Spotted Owl designation were felt
more heavily by the Southern Ute Tribe. At the time of the decision, the
Tribe had not submitted a conservation plan, but had engaged in discus-
sions with the Service to develop a Memorandum of Understanding to fa-
cilitate overall communications between the Service and the Tribe.26
Citing a lack of data, the service refused to exclude Southern Ute lands; it
ultimately included over 61,500 acres of the Southern Ute's reservation in
the designated area. 65
In a lawsuit filed in federal district court in Colorado, the Tribe alleged
that the designation would interfere with its right to manage its trust lands
and resources, and in turn harm economic stability and growth, in violation
of the trust responsibility and various federal statutes including NEPA, the
260. Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. The Chairman added that the application of the
ESA to Indian people and their lands provides "private parties with narrow self-serving agendas"
with an avenue for controlling the tribe's "destiny and that of our aboriginal and ancestral home-
land." Id.
261. See 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374, 13,380 (1994) (San Juan River fishes); 60 Fed. Reg. 29,914,
29,919 (1995) (Mexican Spotted Owl).
262. Chairman's Corner, supra note 205.
263. 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,929-31. See Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. Notably, the White
Mountain Apache is the only tribe to date which has successfully entered into a government-to-
government Statement of Relationship with the FWS on enforcement of the ESA. See Tribe
Tells Congressional Committee How it Forged Landmark Agreement, FORT APACHE SCoUT, Aug.
4, 1995, at 1. The Tribe's Statement of Relationship provided guidance in crafting the Secretarial
Order on Tribe Rights, Trust Responsibilities and Endangered Species. See Bilateralism, supra
note 97, at 1074.
264. 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,930.
265. Id. at 29,919, 29,932. This represents 21% of the Tribes' total land base. GEORGE L.
RUSSELL, A MAP OF AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS (1993). Slightly less than 20% of the total
designated area, 4,632,901 acres, is within the boundaries of the Southern Ute and other Indian
reservations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,921, while 83% consists of federal public lands. Id. at 29,917. In
comparison, the designation blankets minuscule amounts of state land (9,800 acres) and private
lands (111,500 acres). Id. at 29,919. Significantly, the Secretarial Order expressly states that
agencies must recognize that Indian lands are not to be treated as if they were federal public
lands. Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 2.
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ESA, and the Federal Timber Management Act.2 66 Declarations submitted
by the Tribe in support of its request for injunctive relief alleged that the
prohibition of federal activities related to tribal timber harvest, coal mining
and oil and gas development within the area of the Reservation designated
as critical habitat would likely render the Tribe unable to develop its re-
sources,267 and that the economic effects resulting from such a restriction
"would be devastating to the Tribe., 268 The Service's economic study, pre-
pared to support the designation decision and satisfy the requirements of
ESA § 4(b)(2), acknowledged that the decision could have adverse effects
on rural economies dependent on logging,269 including economically de-
pressed Indian Nations, where logging is a significant source of income.27°
Yet, according to the record of decision, there is no evidence that owls are
present on the reservation, 271 and the Tribe argued further that "the physi-
cal and biological features of suitable owl habitat" are not present on the
reservation.272
After the Tribe filed its complaint and motion for summary judgment,
but before a decision was rendered, the Mexican Spotted Owl designation
was set aside by a district court in New Mexico on the grounds that FWS
had failed to prepare NEPA analysis for the designation decision, following
the Tenth Circuit's decision in Catron County Board of Commissioners v.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.273 The court granted the United States' mo-
266. Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5. The Tribe alleged that the designation interfered
with its interest "in the conservation of wild animals and their habitats and ... [its] authority to
implement tribal policies for the protection of wildlife." Southern Ute Complaint, supra, at 27.
See Ute Tribe Accuses Federal Government of Violating Treaty, OnBwE NEWS, June 14, 1996, at 2.
267. 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,927 (1995).
268. Id. at 29,926. It was noted that: "Reduced Tribal timber harvest would account for the
loss of 95 of 120 jobs lost in the Solid Wood and Paper sector (80 percent of direct employment
losses), and 12 of 27 jobs lost in other sectors (44 percent of indirect employment losses [due to
reduced spending by employers and firms])." Id. See also Owl Habitat's Impact Debated, Log-
ging Job Loss May Hurt, Some Say, DENVER POST, Mar. 15, 1995, at B2 (quoting Jennifer Fowler-
Propst of the Fish and Wildlife Service, "[w]e particularly need to look closer at the possible hit
on jobs on Indian nations").
269. Declaration of Robert J. Zahradnik, Energy Exploration and Production Manager for
the Southern Ute Tribe, 16 and Declaration of James M. Olguin, Chief of Natural Resources
Division for the Tribe, 10, attached to the Tribes' Motion for Summary Judgment, Sept. 12,
1996, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, No. 96-M-1369 (copy on file
with author). See also Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5, 28-30.
270. Declaration of Robert J. Zahradnik at 14, Southern Ute (No. 96-M-1369). See also
Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 5, 1$ 28, 30, 74-75 (activities affected by the designation
provide over 90 percent of the Tribe's revenues). Mr. Olguin stated that the prohibition on tim-
ber management in the designated area would result not only in financial harm, but could also
cause overcrowded and unhealthy forest conditions, increasing the likelihood of catastrophic fire
and environmental damage. Declaration of Olguin at J 10, Southern Ute (No. 96-M-1369). See
also Southern Ute Complaint, supra, [ 26. Moreover, the restrictions imposed by designation are
unnecessary because the Tribe already utilizes uneven aged management, which is considered by
FWS to be the "silvicultural method most compatible with maintenance of [owl] habitat." Id.
54-55.
271. 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,917.
272. Southern Ute Complaint, supra note 266, 23.
273. Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Growth v. United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, CIV 95-1285, slip op. at 2 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 1997) (citing Catron County, 75 F.3d
at 1429). At issue in all three cases was whether NEPA analysis is required for a decision to
designate critical habitat under the ESA. The Catron County decision created a split in the cir-
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tion to dismiss the Southern Ute case, on the grounds that the claims are
moot as the critical habitat designation is no longer in place and will not be
enforced in the Tenth Circuit.274
A final example involves the critical habitat designation for four Colo-
rado River Basin fish species,275 a large proportion of which is on tribal
land.276 Although tribes situated in the Four Corners region of the South-
west - Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona - possess senior water
rights in the San Juan River,277 they have only recently received funding to
develop reclamation projects in order to utilize those rights.278 Meanwhile,
huge federal reclamation projects have already been constructed, largely
for the benefit of non-Indian downstream users. These projects have
wrought dramatic changes to the Colorado River system, including the San
Juan River tributary, resulting in severe declines of native fish
populations.279
In preparing the economic study for the critical habitat designation,
FWS assumed that all new development in the upper Basin would be pre-
cluded by the designation decision.28 ° Thus, designation could effectively
destroy the tribes' ability to exercise their senior water rights while al-
lowing the water to continue flowing downstream for the benefit of junior
users.28 1 In other words, the tribes are being required to bear a dispropor-
tionate burden imposed by the ESA's protections for the habitat of listed
species.282
cuits, as the Ninth Circuit had previously held that no such analysis was required for environmen-
tally beneficial actions which are extensively analyzed under the specific factors set forth in the
ESA. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1495.
274. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, No. 96-M-1369, slip op. at 2
(D. Colo. Apr. 4, 1998). See 63 Fed. Reg. 14,378 (Mar. 25, 1998) (revoking designations for owl,
loach minnow and spikedace).
275. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Colorado River Endangered Fishes: Razor-
back Sucker, Colorado Squawfish, Humpback Chub, and Bonytail Chub, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374
(1994).
276. Hansen, supra note 66, at 1331 n.216 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374, 13,384 (1994)).
277. See id. Indian tribes possess federally reserved water rights as of the date their reserva-
tion was created pursuant to the "Winters Doctrine." See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,
577 (1908). While this makes their rights senior to most appropriators, many tribes, like these
four southwestern tribes, have been unable to fully utilize their existing rights. However, Indian
reserved rights, unlike water rights of other users in most western appropriative rights systems,
are not subject to forfeiture or abandonment for non-use. Id. at 577. The quantification of the
reserved rights is based on "practicably irrigable acreage," which accounts for both present and
future water needs. See Arizona v. United States, 373 U.S. 564, 600-01 (1963).
278. See generally Hansen, supra note 66 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the ESA's
restrictions on development of Indian water rights).
279. Id. See generally MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER, 120-44, 255-305, 439-76 (1993) (describing the history and effects of rec-
lamation on the Colorado River system).
280. Id. at 1331. See also 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374, 13,380 (1994).
281. Hansen, supra note 66, at 1306.
282. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 240-41. Professor Tsosie noted that: "Although certain fish
species in the San Juan River are endangered because of non-Indian development, such as diver-
sion of water for non-Indian water projects, the Indian nations, who have historically been ig-
nored, are forced to bear the burdens imposed by the ESA." Id. See also Hansen, supra note 66,
at 1331 (tribes, prohibited from developing their water rights because of listings and critical
habitat designations under the ESA, have been made to "bear a disproportionate burden of the
protection of endangered species").
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The response of the tribes was two-fold. A few months after the
designation decision, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Southern Ute Tribe, Ji-
carilla Apache Tribe and the Navajo Nation served a Notice of Intent to
Sue on the Secretary of the Interior, alleging, inter alia, that FWS had failed
to consider the effect of on tribal economies as required by ESA § 4(b)(2),
and that the subordination of tribal interests to the ESA violated fiduciary
duties.283 In addition, the tribes proposed amendments to the regulations
implementing the ESA, recommending that the FWS may not designate
critical habitat affecting tribal interests if other conservation alternatives
are possible that would protect tribal interests.284
A review of other recent designation decisions yields mixed results. In
two pre-Secretarial Order designations for the Marbled Murrelet and
Northern Spotted Owl, tribal lands were excluded, along with private
lands, on the grounds that the benefits of inclusion were marginal because
the lands in question provided only minimal habitat.285 The decision to
designate critical habitat for the Marbled Murrelet specifically referenced
the federal trust responsibility as an additional reason for exclusion.286
However, other decisions which pre-date the Order included tribal lands
without any finding of the need for their habitat in comparison to sur-
rounding landholdings, much less any determination that inclusion would
be "essential" for the species.287
Perhaps most troubling of all is the designation for the Southwest Wil-
low Flycatcher, the only post-Order decision directly affecting Indian lands
to date. There, Yavapai-Apache and Pala Mission Tribes were given some
283. Hansen, supra note 66, at 1330 (citing Notice of Intent to Sue at 2 (dated June 28, 1994)
[hereinafter Notice]). See Brenda Norrell, Endangered Species Act Hinders Tribal Development,
INDIAN CoUNTRY TODAY, Nov. 10, 1994, at A6 (reporting that Navajo Nation had filed a notice
of intent to sue the United States over the designation of critical habitat for San Juan River
fishes).
284. Hansen, supra note 66, at 1330-31 (citing Notice, supra note 283, at 4). For a discussion
of recent proposals for ESA amendments, see supra notes 74 & 139. In addition, the Southern
Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribes support a bill, the Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights
Act Amendments of 1998, S. 1771 and H.R. 3478, to modify the Animas-La Plata Project (A-LP),
which was designed to meet the water needs of the Tribes and others pursuant to a settlement
agreement approved by Congress in 1988. The A-LP has been delayed, in part, because of ESA
prohibitions. "Among the tribal projects planned to develop San Juan River water, the Animas-
La Plata project has been the most conspicuous victim of ESA-based preemption." Hansen,
supra note 66, at 1327. The proposed Amendments provide for a reclamation project about one-
third the size of the original A-LP. See Electa Draper, Animas-La Plata Down to Wire, Denv.
Post, Sept. 17, 1998, at B6.
285. See Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796,
1805, 1808, 1826 (1992) (excluding all tribal and private lands); Final Designation of Critical
Habitat for the Marbled Murrelet, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,256, 26,266 (1996) (excluding tribal lands of
the Hoopa, Makah, Siletz and Quinault Indian Tribes).
286. 61 Fed. Reg. at 26,266. It was recognized that: "Quinault lands ... were not included...
after consideration of the Federal government's trust responsibilities and the options for achiev-
ing essential conservation contributions through other alternatives." Id.
287. See, e.g., Determination of Critical Habitat for the Mojave population of the Desert Tor-
toise, 59 Fed. Reg. 5820, 5827, 5844 (1997). As discussed above, the final rule designating critical
habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl included Southern Ute lands without finding that their
inclusion was essential for conservation of the species; conversely, it states that no owls were
known to be present on the Southern Ute reservation but that "occupied habitat on adjacent
lands indicate owls may occur on Reservation land." See 60 Fed. Reg. at 29,917.
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consideration in the decision-making process, but their lands were not ulti-
mately excluded from the designation. 88 At least twenty million acres of
tribal lands in Arizona alone were included, representing twenty-eight per-
cent of the designated area in that state. 289 Although the final rule gives
passing reference to the Secretarial Order's requirements, it fails to make
any of the required findings regarding the "essential" nature of habitat on
tribal lands as compared to surrounding non-Indian lands.29 ° In fact, the
rule and its environmental assessment provide no analysis of any of the
Order's requirements. 91 Moreover, it appears that only the most cursory
consultation with affected tribes occurred.292 If a court were to review this
decision with the Secretarial Order's requirements as its backdrop, the fail-
ure to consult and to consider alternatives other than designation of tribal
lands would provide grounds for setting aside the designation.293
The designation of critical habitat in Indian Country raises a special
concern under distributive justice principles because designation has a
more marked effect on Indian lands than it does on private lands. When
critical habitat designations include Indian lands, Section 7 consultation re-
quirements, which apply only when some federal nexus is present (such as
BIA approval of contracts or leases), are especially likely to pose a serious
288. 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,135.
289. Environmental Assessment, Designation of Critical Habitat for Southwestern Willow
Flycatcher, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (July 3, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Envi-
ronmental Assessment]. Indian lands in New Mexico and California were also included. Id. As
is the case with many critical habitat designations, FWS was under a strict court-ordered deadline
when it issued the final decision for the Flycatcher. 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,130.
290. See Secretarial Order, Appendix § 3(B)(4) (prioritizing tribal interests in the designation
decision). See also Secretarial Order § 5, princ. 3(C) (requiring equitable distribution of conser-
vation burdens).
291. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,135; Environmental Assessment, supra note 289.
292. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,135 (noting that FWS consulted with tribes to ensure that tribal
values were considered, and that the agency plans to remain available to tribes to assist them with
conservation plans); Environmental Assessment, supra note 289, at 6-7 (description of scoping
and public participation provides no discussion of tribal involvement). Given the tight schedule
for designation, it seems unlikely that meaningful participation and full information exchange
occurred as envisioned by the Secretarial Order. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,130 (stating that, due to
"unprecedented time constraints resulting from the court order, the Service was not able to pro-
vide the level of analysis and completeness that it has in the past on such rules. The Service is
designating critical habitat for the southwestern willow flycatcher as it was proposed in 1993...");
Environmental Assessment, supra, at 6 (noting lack of economic information and inability to
perform a complete economic analysis as of February 27, 1995, when the Flycatcher was finally
listed as endangered, see 60 Fed. Reg. 10,694).
293. See Motor Vehicles Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 42 (finding that failure to consider relevant factors
renders a decision arbitrary and capricious); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp.
at 256 (finding failure to prioritize tribal water rights over those of non-Indian irrigators arbitrary
and capricious where Secretary simply made "judgment call" to placate irrigators and failed to
take trust responsibility to Tribe into account); Washington Dep't of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1470-72
(holding that EPA's efforts to promote tribal environmental self-determination by refusing to
delegate authority for hazardous waste management in Indian Country to State was reasonable,
given the trust responsibility toward tribes and the federal self-determination policy). The Mexi-
can Spotted Owl designation would also be vulnerable to challenge as arbitrary and capricious
and a breach of trust. Although the Order does not impose additional requirements for Depart-
mental actions which are substantially completed, Secretarial Order § 2(E), if FWS decides to go
forward with NEPA analysis pursuant to the Coalition of Counties decision and re-designate tri-
bal lands as critical habitat for the owl, the Order would likely apply.
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obstacle to tribal development proposals.2 94 Because non-Indian develop-
ment has proceeded at such a rapid pace, and because its effects on wildlife
habitat are so pervasive, the agencies' current method of determining
whether or not jeopardy might result from an activity which entails some
federal involvement under Section 7 is almost pre-ordained to fall more
heavily on activities on Indian lands.295 In developing a baseline against
which to measure effects of a proposed action for the purposes of issuing
Section 7 biological opinions, FWS considers the cumulative impacts of
past and ongoing actions on the species and its critical habitat.2 96 More
recent development proposals by Indian tribes may well be precluded as
the "straw that broke the camel's back" - the added activity which, given
past and ongoing non-Indian activities, jeopardizes the species or imper-
missibly degrades its habitat.
FWS should undertake affirmative steps to ascertain potential tribal
development rights whenever possible when consulting on federal actions
which implicate Indian interests.2 97 In some areas of resource develop-
ment, in particular water resources development, it is possible, though diffi-
cult, to formulate reasoned predictions of the quantity of Indian reserved
water rights, even if they are not yet being utilized.298 While it may not
always be possible to predict tribal development plans, the Secretarial Or-
der's requirements for "the earliest possible notification" and involvement
of tribes would help, if fully implemented by the agencies.
294. See Tim Vollman, The Endangered Species Act and Indian Water Rights, 11 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 39, 41 (1996) (Section 7 has been seen as a "significant procedural and sub-
stantive obstacle to development"). Critical habitat designations in Indian Country can be said to
represent the trust responsibility "turning in on itself" - the primary reason that critical habitat
presents significant on-the-ground obstacles as applied to Indian lands is that the BIA, acting in
accordance with the trust responsibility as defined by federal mineral and timber management
statutes, has assumed such extensive authority over activities in Indian Country in the first place.
Not surprisingly, federal approval procedures sometimes act as both a blessing and a curse.
295. See Clinton Critique, supra note 21, at 769, 780.
296. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1998).
297. See Vollman, supra note 294, at 43 (noting that tribal rights should be taken into account
in establishing baseline, and that, in some cases, the exercise of tribal water rights may require
reinitiation of consultation on ongoing projects).
298. See Hansen, supra note 66, at 1341-42. Indian reserved water rights should be included in
the environmental baseline used in issuing Section 7 biological opinions, and the BIA should
have a responsibility to provide FWS with a "reasonable estimate of the tribe's water right based
on PIA or other appropriate standard." Id. at 1342. Including projections for future develop-
ment on Indian lands in baseline analysis, however, will not address the situation where a species'
need for habitat protections is so great that tribal lands must be included, and all development is
curtailed. There, neighboring landowners who have enjoyed the benefits of extensive past and on
going development activities could be required to make payments to tribes who are forced to
forego tribal resource development. In the water rights arena, Professor Getches has proposed
that an endangered species surcharge be assessed against beneficiaries who receive the water
which tribes with senior rights might have developed but for ESA restrictions. See Hansen, supra
note 66, at 1342 (citing Hearings before the Subcommittee on Water and Power, Committee on
Energy and Resources (June 9, 1994) (statement of David H. Getches)). A surcharge would, in
effect, require junior users of tribal water to compensate the tribes for the value of the water,
which the tribes themselves are not able to use because of ESA constraints, through "involun-
tary" forbearance agreements. Id. Hansen noted that: "If water cannot be used on the land
itself to sustain a homeland for the tribes, than the tribes must at least obtain the value of the
water right. Payments in lieu of water could then be used to develop the reservation economy."
Id.
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B. THE ESA's POLICY OF CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES AND THEIR
ECOSYSTEMS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN INDIAN COUNTRY
WITHOUT CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATIONS
In contrast to the critical role played by reservation lands and re-
sources in the survival of Indian Nations, when it comes to imperiled spe-
cies, critical habitat, in most cases, adds little protection to the ESA's "first
line" of defense - inclusion on the endangered or threatened species
list.2 99 The primary effect of designation is felt in areas which are suitable
but, as yet, unoccupied by a listed species because degradation of habitat
which foreseeably harms a listed species known to be present in an area is
already prohibited as an unlawful "take" under Section 9,300 or as jeopard-
izing the species, in situations where Section 7 is applicable.30 '
In addition to the ESA's species-related provisions, other federal envi-
ronmental statutes provide for protection of wildlife habitat in Indian
Country. For example, NEPA affords important procedural protections for
"major federal actions" on Indian lands, such as federal permit require-
ments and BIA approval of development leases.30 2 NEPA requires exten-
sive environmental analysis of potential impacts and alternatives, in the
form of an environmental assessment ("EA"), or, if environmental impacts
may be significant, a more detailed environmental impact statement(,,EIS,,).303
Although NEPA does not force the tribe or the BIA to chose or ap-
prove the alternative which causes the least impact to a listed species and
its habitat,30 4 it does require informed decision-making based on relevant
environmental factors, one of which is the presence of protected species.3 °5
In addition, an EIS typically explores possible mitigation measures which
would avoid or minimize adverse environmental effects. 3 6 By requiring
299. Declaration of Steven L. Spangle 6 and Declaration of Gerry Jackson 6, attached to
Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Oct. 10, 1996, Southern Ute Indian
Tribe v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, No. 96-M-1369 (explaining that agency's listing priority
guidance for activities during budget-strapped FY96 and FY97 placed critical habitat designations
at the lowest priority (Tier 4) because it typically results in only limited conservation benefits
beyond those protections provided by listing of the species itself). See also 61 Fed. Reg. 24,722
(1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 48,962 (1996). For a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of designation
and listing of conservation tools which could be more effective and less burdensome, see supra
notes 101-07.
300. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; Sweet
Home, 515 U.S. at 690.
301. 16 U.S.C. § 1536. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,131-32.
302. See e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1972). See Gover & Walker, supra
note 224, at 940-41. See generally Dean Suagee, The Application of the National Environmental
Policy Act to "Development" in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 377 (1991).
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
304. See Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 556 (upholding environmental impact statement for uranium
mining). See also Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Az. 1990) (even though
EIS showed that off-reservation sacred sites would be harmed, court held that NEPA's process-
oriented duties had been satisfied), affd, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 959
(1992).
305. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(8).
306. See Gover & Walker, supra note 224, at 941.
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thorough consideration of potential consequences and alternatives before
action is taken, and by involving stakeholders and interested members of
the public in the decisionmaking process, NEPA provides an important
layer of environmental protection. °7
Beyond the requirements of federal statutes, additional safeguards can
be found in the fish and wildlife codes of many tribes, which provide pro-
tections for imperiled species and their habitat.308 In addition, consistent
with the traditional ecological values model, many tribal fish and game
codes provide protections for wildlife and fish species in general, even
those whose populations are not imperiled.30 9 Where tribes have been able
to enact and implement their own resource requirements, either through
written codes or otherwise, success stories, such as that of the White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe, abound.310 As Chairman Lupe noted, "We [the White
Mountain Apache] are self-regulating. If our homeland is destroyed, we
have nowhere else to go. We will not allow that to happen. 311
This is not to say that there has been, or will be, no environmental
degradation as a result of mineral or water resource development, timber
307. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 96, at 361 (NEPA is a "critical element" in land and
resource management); Andrea L. Hungerford, Comment, Changing the Management of Public
Lands Forests: The Role of the Spotted Owl Injunctions, 24 ENVTL. L. 1395, 1433-34 (1994) (con-
cluding NEPA has influenced environmental policy in far-reaching ways).
308. See Lewis, supra note 212, at *6 (noting that the Jicarilla Apache's wildlife program "has
become a model for the state of New Mexico"); Johnson, supra note 115, at 191 & n.111 (citing
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Ordinance 44D (prohibiting hunting of bald eagles,
wolves and grizzly bears unless allowed by the tribal cultural committee)); Clinton Critique, supra
note 21, at 791-92 (discussing salmon restoration plans and policies of Columbia River treaty
tribes in the Pacific Northwest). See also Brendale, 492 U.S. 408 (zoning ordinance of Yakama
Indian Nation closed a heavily forested area of the reservation, restricting public access to protect
water quality and wildlife); Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (describing tribal fish and game
code); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982) (discuss-
ing tribal protection of riparian areas to promote water quality and fisheries).
309. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 300 n.450 (citing ROBERT D. COOTER & WOLFGANG
FIKENTSCHER, Is TREP.Z INDIAN COMMON LAW? TIHE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN AMERICAN INDIAN
TRIBAL COURTS 8 (1994)). For example, the Blackfeet Tribe requires members to use the whole
animal after it is killed: "[w]asting any part of an animal, as trophy hunters do, is a crime on the
Blackfeet reservation." Id. See also Kapashesit & Klippenstein, supra note 241, at 932-34 (dis-
cussing Cree's practice of recognizing "hunting bosses" with responsibility for understanding the
condition of natural resources within a particular area to regulate behavior in that area). Inter-
tribal groups have also played a significant role in managing trans-jurisdictional species, such as
salmon and bison. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 213 (1992) (describing technical and scientific expertise of Co-
lumbia River Intertribal Fish Commission as "second to none" in salmon management); Buffalo
Pact Will Help an Old Friend, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 28, 1997, at A09 (describing Inter-
Tribal Bison Cooperative's proposals to resolve controversy caused by exodus of bison, which are
feared to spread brucellosis to domestic cattle, from Yellowstone Park; bison could be quaran-
tined and shipped to tribal lands).
310. Johnson, Honoring Treaty Rights, supra note 115, at 191 n.111-13; Tsosie, supra note 46,
at 295-96. For a discussion of tribal successes with resources, see supra notes 253-256.
311. Chairman's Corner, supra note 205. For discussion of the point that American Indians
have used the land and its resources without destroying it, and will continue to do so, see First
American, supra note 233, at 18 ("As an Indian I think: 'You say that I use the land, and I reply,
yes, it is true; but it is not the first truth. The first truth is that I love the land; I see that it is
beautiful; I delight in it; I am alive in it."') and Getches, supra note 216, at 34 (noting that tribes,
"remaining true to their resource preservation values," use the earth's resources "with a sensitive
touch"). For a further discussion, see supra notes 250-252 and accompanying text.
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harvest or grazing, even if it proceeds in accordance with tribal norms and
ecological values. Yet, it is likely that the worst examples of environmental
harm have flowed directly from the "vagaries of federal policies," '312 partic-
ularly in the mineral leasing area.313 Realization of tribal sovereignty and
self-determination will help avoid contamination and destruction of
habitat, particularly where federal resources are made readily available in
the form of information exchange, training in wildlife management and sus-
tainable development, and adequate funding.314
Finally, federal-tribal co-management initiatives can provide effective
protections for listed species and their habitat, thereby avoiding the need
for heavy-handed federal controls.315 Partnerships between tribes and state
wildlife managers have proven beneficial, both with respect to species con-
servation and the promotion of inter-governmental relationships.31 6 If
tribes are made full participants with mutual management authority, coop-
erative agreements, encouraged by the Secretarial Order, can play an im-
portant role in conserving resources and distributing the burdens of
protection more equitably.
CONCLUSION
Tribal lands are critical habitat, first and foremost, for Indian Nations.
The use and preservation of reservation lands and resources are essential
for maintaining tribal sovereignty, as well as economic and cultural viabil-
ity. The Secretarial Order, if implemented by agencies and enforced by
federal courts as an expression of the trust responsibility, maintains tribal
sovereignty and self-determination by requiring meaningful government-
to-government consultations and prioritizing Indian interests over compet-
ing interests.
Although the Order does not strictly preclude designation of critical
habitat in Indian Country, it does provide significant limitations on agency
312. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 324; Indian Land, supra note 28, at 1480.
313. See AMBLER, supra note 200, at 174-92 (describing adverse environmental conditions re-
sulting from leasing activities at uranium mines and mills and coal mines, and tribal efforts to
assume regulatory control to protect their land base and tribal health and well-being). There are
additional factors which have likely contributed to environmental degradation of Indian lands,
including the decreasing land-base caused by the allotment policy, increasing population, pres-
sures from Anglo-American markets and values, and perhaps even loss of cultural identity and
norms. See Tsosie, supra note 46, at 310-11.
314. Chairman Lupe of the White Mountain Apache Tribe explained that one reason his tribe
had been able to reach a Statement of Relationship on ESA enforcement on Indian lands was
because FWS acknowledged the Tribe's sovereign authority and capacity to manage its own land
and resource, and because FWS's technical expertise in wildlife issues was, in turn, recognized as
a significant resource for the Tribe's management of ecosystems and associated species. Chair-
man's Corner, supra note 205. He also noted that development of management plans was very
expensive: "responses to regulatory requirements of the [ESA] unnecessarily deplete our finan-
cial resources and deflect us from accomplishing our Tribal goals." Id.
315. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 325 (holding that state conservation efforts were
preempted where tribe, with cooperation and assistance of federal government, implemented
comprehensive fish and game management program).
316. For an examination of partnerships between tribes and state officials, see supra notes
180-183 and accompanying text.
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discretion to do so, and effectuates the ESA's requirement that identified
areas be excluded from designation if the benefits of exclusion outweigh
the benefits of inclusion. The fulfillment of tribal self-determination and
the trust responsibility toward Indian lands and natural resources, includ-
ing other wildlife resources, should weigh heavily in favor of exclusion in
most cases. As a result, only those areas within Indian Country which are
truly critical to the survival of an endangered or threatened species, as
shown by compelling scientific data, will be included within the designa-
tion, and then only after other possible conservation measures have been
considered through meaningful consultation with tribes.
